

## Cabinet

14 February 2019

### Kenilworth Station Review

#### Recommendation

That Cabinet agrees the recommendations of the Kenilworth Station Task and Finish Group (TFG).

#### 1.0 Introduction

- 1.1 Kenilworth's new railway station opened on Monday 30 April 2018. The introduction of services at the new station marked the end of a campaign by local residents lasting over two decades. It is widely regarded as a welcome addition to the fabric of the town currently seeing an hourly service, six days a week to Coventry and Leamington Spa.
- 1.2 To have constructed and opened a new station and to have introduced an entirely new passenger service within budget is a major achievement. However, in order to get to the position where services were operating, a series of challenges had to be overcome. Meeting these challenges meant that on a number of occasions the opening date for the station needed to be revised. This was a source of frustration to local residents, employers and partners involved in the project.
- 1.3 At its meeting on 20 March 2018 the County Council agreed that a review be undertaken to consider the reasons behind the delays encountered with a view to learning lessons that can be applied to future rail projects in Warwickshire and elsewhere.
- 1.4 On 14 November 2018 the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee received an update report on progress with the review. At the meeting the Independent Chair of the TFG, John Bridgeman CBE, briefed members on progress, setting out some of the emerging themes from the review. Members welcomed that the station was open and commended all those involved for its success.
- 1.5 On 16 January 2019 the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee considered the draft report and recommendations. An extract of the minutes from that meeting is given at Appendix A.

- 1.6 The review report is attached as Appendix B. This has been refined since 16 January 2019 taking on board feedback from rail advisers and the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee.
- 1.7 It is not considered necessary to repeat in this covering report that which is contained in the TFG's report. However, Cabinet's attention is particularly drawn to the TFG's recommendations set out below.

## **2.0 TFG Recommendations**

### **Future Rail Reviews**

1. That the Leader of Warwickshire County Council should write to the Secretary of State for Transport requesting that future reviews take greater account of the needs of local authorities and partners in rail enhancement projects. This should particularly draw attention to the financial and social impact that changes in policy can have on on-going projects.

### **Learning Lessons**

2. That the current practice of holding a "Lessons Learned" session on the completion of every major transport project, where considered appropriate involving all partners (including relevant elected representatives) be continued and that messages resulting from that session be published and circulated widely.
3. That given its track record of successful delivery of new stations Warwickshire County Council commits to the ongoing maintenance of a body of evidence regarding past major transport projects and lessons learned from them.
4. That at the inception of any major transport projects the Project Manager convenes a short life working group comprising council officers and members and other partners to review lessons learned from previous projects undertaken in Warwickshire and elsewhere

### **Governance**

5. That, as is already the practice, at the commencement of a major transport scheme (once partners have been appointed/ identified) a meeting be convened by officers of Warwickshire County of senior representatives from those agencies involved to develop a mutual understanding of the project's objectives and of roles and responsibilities. The meeting should be accompanied and guided by clear terms of reference placing it on a formal footing.
6. That the terms of the reference for the Major Schemes Board be reviewed by the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee with consideration being given to how it can offer support to others in the governance structure when greater authority is required to be used.

## **The Intervention Stage**

7. That, recognising limitations on resources, the Leader of the Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport with a request that consideration be given to ways in which rail industry partners enter into binding commercial agreements to deliver their agreed outputs.

## **Funding**

8. That the Leader of the Council be asked to liaise with the Coventry and Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership (and other funding providers) to explain the negative effect that the application of very tight and rigid funding timescales can have on effective project management.
9. That during negotiations regarding funding partners who will be involved in project delivery be invited to liaise with fund holders to establish a common understanding of the challenges around timescales.

## **Communication**

10. That from the commencement of a major transport project its nature and complexity and the reliance by partners on each other should be made explicit in all internal and external communications.
11. From the outset communications should be clear regarding the extent of the scheme, the services it will offer and the benefits it will bring. These messages should be repeated throughout the life of the project build.
12. That so far as is practicable all communications to the media and to communities be produced and broadcast collectively by all partners.
13. That whilst being honest and transparent completion dates for major transport schemes should be indicative only – as with the delivery of Highway Projects. This should be made clear in all communications.

## **Entry into Service**

14. That consideration be given to the adoption of the improvements to the entry into service process as suggested by SLC Rail. These are:
  - The appointment of an EiS Manager who will have overall responsibility to deliver the EiS element of the works needs to be identified & resourced in the early stages of GRIP 5 to assist the Project PM.
  - Resource planning templates to be further developed and included with milestone prompts to identify the increased workload towards EiS
  - EiS needs to be on the project agenda earlier, ideally reflecting in early GRIP Stage PMP's

- The project Design Manager needs to be aware of all 'EiS engineering deliverables' so they are readily populated in a specific EiS project folder as they are approved through GRIP Stage 5 and 6
- Production of an EiS Strategy reflecting stakeholders for each element of the phased programme that do not necessarily have a NR concern, an example of this could be the local highways
- Seek to have phased hand-over for practicable completion where practicable
- Appointment of an Engineering Safety Manager
- Have EiS included early in to the stakeholder agenda's so stakeholders plan and provide the resource necessary for their responsibilities
- Identify named individuals from the key stakeholders responsible for EiS interface, this should also include the Principal Contractor
- Ensure EiS robustly shown in Employers programme so all parties are aware of the timescales and critical activities to ensure a smooth EiS
- Plan EiS to occur as defined activity within GRIP Stage 7, after successful conclusion of GRIP Stage 6 Inc. all testing, commissioning, training and certification thus project resources working on just GRIP Stage 7 deliverables
- Contractor programmes to reflect specific EiS deliverables required e.g. so delivered earlier in proceedings

### **Data Room**

15. That the Leader of Warwickshire County Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport highlighting the difficulties the “snap shot” approach currently used by the Data Room can present to franchise bidders and the issues it presented to the current train operator in terms of its preparedness to operate trains to Kenilworth.

### **Political Intervention**

16. That as is current practice, from the early stages of a major transport project local MPs and Councillors be fully briefed by partners on its detail, both in terms of business case and potential challenges.

### **Changes in Franchise**

17. That in order to reduce disruption to evolving rail projects the Leader of the Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport asking that consideration be given to the introduction of a period of transition when rail franchises change.

### 3.0 Financial Implications

3.1 The Task and Finish Group considers that most of its recommendations place no major financial burden on any agency. Its principal focus is around continuing to apply good practice or the introduction of new processes and approaches that will further enhance effective partnership working.

### 4.0 Action Plan

4.1 In order to ensure that the recommendations set out in the report are implemented an action plan will be developed. This will identify officers and members as well as timings.

### Appendices

- A) Extract from minutes of Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee 16 January 2019
- B) Review of the Process and Events Leading to the Opening of the New Kenilworth Railway Station in April 2018

### Background Papers

None

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The report was considered by the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee on 16 January 2019

## **Appendix A - Extract from Minutes of Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee Meeting 16 January 2019**

### **4. Kenilworth Station Review**

John Bridgeman presented the report of the Task & Finish which was due to be presented to Cabinet in February 2019. Mr Bridgeman stated that the report was still in draft form and he would welcome any feedback from the Committee. He stated that one addition which would be made was the inclusion of a glossary as the report contained around 60 technical phrases and abbreviations specific to the rail industry. Since the Committee last received an update in November 2018 the Task and Finish group had met with West Midlands Trains, Network Rail, the Department for Transport and SLC Rail. Mr Bridgeman stated that it was a tribute to the hard work of officers that all this feedback had been incorporated into the report in time for the Committee to review it.

Members thanked John Bridgeman for the report and provided the following feedback:

- As well as a standalone glossary it would be beneficial to define terms within the text as it was difficult of a layman to understand the technical language.
- Members welcomed the recommendation around reviewing previous projects at the start of future major projects as it was noted that Kenilworth Station while having its own set of issues had experienced similar problems to other rail projects undertaken by the Council. Members hoped that learning from the review would benefit future rail projects in Stratford and Rugby.
- Members noted the comments in the report around the failure to provide a fully joined up service from Kenilworth to Nuneaton through Coventry but accepted that this was outside of the remit of the review and thus was not fully investigated.
- Members highlighted the need to ensure that there were clear lines of communication to residents especially to communicate when there had been delays and welcomed the recommendations around communications.

### **Resolved**

That the Committee notes the report and recommendations of the Kenilworth Station Review Task and Finish Group (TFG).



## **Review of the Process and Events Leading to the Opening of the New Kenilworth Railway Station in April 2018**



**February 2019**

*Working for  
Warwickshire*

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# Review of the Process and Events Leading to the Opening of the New Kenilworth Railway Station in April 2018

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## Foreword by John Bridgeman CBE – Independent Chair of the Task and Finish Group

Since 1998 passenger rail travel in Britain has grown by more than 60% and in some places the number of passengers has more than doubled. In 2018/19 passenger numbers are at their highest ever level. At the same time the amount of traffic on our roads has also significantly increased leading to greater congestion and a reduction in air quality in towns and cities. The need to make best use of our rail infrastructure to carry people has never been more important.

Kenilworth in Warwickshire, with its population of 22,500 (and growing) is divided by a rail line that joins Leamington Spa and Coventry. However, since the Beeching cuts (when the former station was closed in 1965) it had until April 2018 lacked any passenger rail connection. Eventually a group of farsighted individuals sought to see this regrettable position reversed and began to campaign for a new station. Warwickshire County Council listened and set about working with the local community and partners to agree what needed to be done and source the funds to do it.

Many hurdles had to be overcome but eventually on 30 April 2018 the first train in 53 years pulled into Kenilworth Station. Amongst the celebrations however was a sense of frustration as opening of the new station had been promised for 17 months earlier. People wanted to understand why the station had taken so long to open especially after it appeared to be complete and awaiting its first passengers for some time.

Recognising that there are always lessons to be learned from complex projects such as that in Kenilworth I have been able to oversee, in an independent capacity, a review of the reasons behind those delays. The review has been undertaken by Councillors from Warwickshire County Council and Kenilworth Town Council working with officers of the County Council and their Rail Industry partners and I am pleased now to present their findings. Throughout the review I have noted how no one has sought to apportion blame or make political gain from the delays encountered. There has been a clear sense that delays have been outweighed by the benefits of the new station and to an important route on the national rail infrastructure.

Early on in the review concern was raised that there was a risk that the County Council would be “marking its own books”. That is to say a review into the Council’s activities by the Council itself might not be as rigorous as otherwise might be appropriate. My independent role and the experience I have brought to this process means that I can assure the reader that I am satisfied that this is not the case. Indeed, I have been impressed by the professionalism and the willingness to share their experiences of all parties involved in the delivery of the new station and its new passenger service.

The reader will see that lessons have been identified. Some of these lessons concern not what should have been done but also what has been done well and should be continued. I expect these to be absorbed by the County Council and also shared with partners including those in the rail industry which itself is now subject to a far-reaching national review.

During the course of our work we have learned of councils that are reluctant to promote rail projects owing to their complexity and the risk of criticism. (Warwickshire County Council already has a highly impressive track record of third party delivery of new stations; Warwick Parkway - 2000; Coleshill Parkway - 2007; Stratford-upon-Avon Parkway - 2011; Bermuda Park – 2016 and Kenilworth -2018). I am pleased to affirm that there is no evidence of such thoughts in Warwickshire where there is a commitment to pursue future rail related schemes as time and money permit. Clearly the County Council is committed to building on past successes as evidenced by its plans for a new Rugby Parkway station.

I must thank all those who have contributed their time and thoughts to this review. Regardless of their background or professional affiliations their candour and commitment has been of the highest order.

## Executive Summary

In April 2018 the first trains in over 50 years stopped to pick up and set down passengers at Kenilworth Station. That this was possible was due to the efforts of residents of the town, local authority officers and Councillors and partners in the rail industry.

The station opened 17 months later than originally planned. The original planned opening date was December 2016. However, a series of circumstances conspired to this date requiring review on several occasions. The decision to broadcast revised opening dates which were then missed led to a degree of frustration from Kenilworth residents and local politicians.

In response to concerns raised, the County Council decided to undertake a task and finish review of the project following its completion. The purpose of the review was to “explore what factors influenced the opening date and to identify any lessons to be learned for future rail projects”.

The review involved engagement with partners from the rail industry, officers from the County Council, users of the station and residents of Kenilworth. In addition, Kenilworth Town Council was invited to participate in the review, their representatives making a useful contribution. The net result has been a body of evidence which in turn has led to the development of a series of recommendations.

The following agencies provided evidence for the review:

- SLC Rail
- West Midlands Railway (operated by West Midlands Trains Ltd)
- Network Rail
- Department for Transport

A questionnaire was circulated to service users and material produced by officers of the County Council providing details of the project.

Terms of reference were agreed and an independent Chair, John Bridgeman CBE appointed.

The review considered the following.

1. The basis of the scheme
2. Other new station schemes
3. Governance arrangements
4. Funding and restrictions imposed by funding providers
5. The impact of the Hendy Review (re-planning of Network Rail’s investment programme)
6. The impact of the change of rail franchise to West Midlands Trains on the project (securing rolling stock and train crew)
7. The potential influence of other rail operators on matters such as timetabling
8. The role of Network Rail at the intervention stage (Changes to infrastructure)

9. The role of the Department for Transport
10. The role of the Office of Rail and Road
11. The role of SLC Rail (the rail advisor)
12. Entry into service
13. Communications
14. The role of the local MP in keeping the project on track
15. The impact of delays in opening on local residents and commuters
16. Wider challenges facing the rail industry in the UK
17. The need to learn from the experience and to remember to reflect on lessons learned when embarking on projects in the future.

Through its research the Task and Finish Group identified a series of factors that served to complicate the overall project and slow its progress. These can be summarised thus.

Influencing Factors/Stages	Time Period of Impact
Government Policy (Hendy Review)	December 2016 to May 2017
Interface with Interventions Project	May 2017 to August 2017
Operational Matters (rolling stock)	May 2017 to August 2017
Interventions Project	May 2017 to August 2017
Franchise Considerations (rolling stock)	December 2017- February 2018
ORR approval	December 2017 to February 2018
Entry into Service approval	February 2018 to April 2018

(Note that some challenges arose or were addressed concurrently)

Having listened to and considered an extensive body of evidence the Task and Finish Group arrived at the following headline conclusion.

Warwickshire is a highly experienced “third party” deliverer of rail projects with 5 new stations opened in the county in 18 years.

Kenilworth presented special and particular challenges compared to the County Council’s 4 earlier new stations given its location on the single-line Coventry-Leamington section of the Southampton to Birmingham Main Line and the need for wholly new train services and associated rolling stock.

The wider industry context of the Hendy Review of Network Rail’s work-bank, which included its infrastructure project supporting the Kenilworth scheme, and the change of operating franchise from London Midland to West Midlands Trains, both within the immediate Kenilworth delivery programme, added further challenges to the scheme.

There are many lessons that can be learned for the project and by all partners involved.

In more specific terms the following have been highlighted.

**The Hendy Review** – This national review into rail infrastructure spending had a major impact on the project coming as it did at a point when planning was well advanced on the basis of twin tracking-the line through Kenilworth. A need to undertake fresh design work and get this agreed added more than four months to the time required to complete the project.

**Governance** – Governance of the project was generally sound although there are areas in which this could be refined further for future projects. From 2011 all parties had an opportunity to be fully involved in the project although time elapsed and staff changes can lead to a loss of “corporate memory”. It is clear that all parties need to be involved in projects at the earliest opportunity, are clear about their role and their capacity to ensure rapid progress by working cooperatively together.

**Funding** – When funding is secured it is usually conditional on meeting certain completion deadlines. It can be very difficult to meet those deadlines with fixed yearly funding profiles. Greater flexibility across the funding period would be helpful.

**The Interventions\* Stage** – It is important that all parties take account of the complex nature of infrastructure changes and the need to plan and complete this in a timely manner.

\* Interventions are the works undertaken on the rail infrastructure eg moving of track and installation of new signalling.

**Changes to Franchise** - Close to the end of the project the franchise for the train operator changed from London Midland Trains to West Midlands Trains. Although many staff transferred over from one company to the other the change did lead to unanticipated difficulties in securing rolling stock and undertaking crew training. In providing a unit to deliver the service West Midlands Trains has exposed itself to a degree of risk.

**Signalling** – Because the new Kenilworth service was to operate over the national cross country route and over a single track shared with freight operators Network Rail decided that investment in a major signalling upgrade should be made at Leamington Spa. This reflects how tabling a project can bring about positive outcomes that were previously unforeseen.

**The Role of the Local MP** – Evidence provided shows that having the local MP close to and supportive of a project is very useful. This is considered to be a key part of their role as representatives of their constituents.

**Entry into Service (including Mechanical and Electrical Installation)** – The latter stages of any project can see many details requiring close attention. In the case of Kenilworth Station, the recognition of the requirement to ensure that all passenger handling and safety measures were considered as a whole from the outset for the station build and the interventions project. A shortage of mechanical and electrical installation engineers and a degree of final redesign and construction work made entry into service a particular challenge.

**Communication** – Recognising the importance of the new station to the town of Kenilworth, stakeholders set out to ensure that the community would be kept fully up to date on its progress. A number of approaches with various media were adopted collectively and separately by partners. As the project approached completion so more announcements were made regarding what was at the time believed to be a realistic opening date. In doing so, however, expectations were understandably raised. When delays were announced so frustration grew. A key lesson for the review has been to be less precise when announcing completion dates for major projects. This does not mean that there should be a lack of transparency. Indeed, a further lesson to be learned is that communication channels should be fully utilised to make clear to people the complexity of any project being embarked upon and the precise nature of what people can expect at the end.

**The Importance of Recognising that Which Went Well** – Every agency involved in the project brought practices developed over many years to the table. It is important to acknowledge that lessons have been learned from the past which enabled mistakes to be avoided. There are lessons to be learned from these as well so that good practice is not only acknowledged but continued into the future.

The Task and Finish Group has developed a series of recommendations.

## Recommendations

### Future Rail Reviews

1. That the Leader of Warwickshire County Council should write to the Secretary of State for Transport requesting that future reviews take greater account of the needs of local authorities and partners in rail enhancement projects. This should particularly draw attention to the financial and social impact that changes in policy can have on on-going projects.

### Learning Lessons

2. That the current practice of holding a “Lessons Learned” session on the completion of every major transport project, where considered appropriate involving all partners (including relevant elected representatives) be continued and that messages resulting from that session be published and circulated widely.
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## 1. Introduction

Kenilworth is a medium sized market town in Warwickshire. It lies roughly equidistant between Coventry to the north and Leamington Spa to the south. The town is perhaps best known for its castle which in 2017 attracted 120,000 visitors. It also has a thriving employment base with retail, services and manufacturing represented. On 10 January 2016 the population of the town was estimated at 22,014 but with the current Warwick District Local Plan proposing the construction of almost 2000 new dwellings by 2029 that population is clearly set to grow significantly.

Until 30 April 2018 and for the preceding 53 years everybody entering Kenilworth arrived by road be it by private car, taxi, bus, bicycle or by walking. Significant growth in car ownership and usage has, especially in recent years begun to apply major pressure onto the highway network. Key locations around the town are heavily congested at certain times of the day and an incident on one of the major trunk routes that pass through Warwickshire can have a major knock-on effect on the town as drivers seek alternative routes to reach their destinations.

Between December 1844 and January 1965 Kenilworth was served by rail. Passenger and goods traffic used a station that sat conveniently on the edge of the town. Over the years many famous people including Royalty used the station. However post-war the growth in car ownership and the use of motor vehicles for longer distance goods handling saw a decline in rail patronage which in turn led to the identification by Dr Richard Beeching in his report, "The Reshaping of British Railways" of Kenilworth as a station set for closure.



*Kenilworth Station in the 1964*

During the 1990s pressure began to mount within the community for a new Kenilworth Station. This was picked up by Warwickshire County Council and in 2008 work began with partners on the preparation of a business case for such a station. This was included in the Council's Local Transport Plan. An early attempt to get the project running foundered in 2011 when funding for the scheme could not be secured.

In February 2013 a funding bid for £5m was submitted by Warwickshire County Council to the government's New Stations Fund. This bid was successful giving the green light for further discussions to be held with partners.

The project addressed a series of major challenges along the way but on 30 April 2018 the first passenger train pulled into the new station. At the time of writing the station

sees an hourly service between Monday and Saturday although it is anticipated that this frequency will in time increase as will the number of carriages used.

Although the station has been welcomed by the people of Kenilworth a number have questioned why it took longer to come into operation than had originally been indicated. The station existed and to all intents and purposes looked ready for use and yet for several months, despite assurances, no trains stopped there.

This report, commissioned by Warwickshire County Council and independently chaired by John Bridgeman CBE, is the result of a review into the period leading up to the opening of the station. Inevitably it touches at times on earlier stages in the station project but its principal purpose is to identify aspects of the project from which the Council, its partners and the wider rail industry can learn.

The report has been produced following consideration of a body of evidence gathered from officers within the County Council as well as partners and also service users. Its structure is aimed at giving the reader a concise assessment of the challenges addressed by everyone involved as well as setting out a series of recommendations to be noted and acted on as they relate to other similar schemes.

## 1.1 The Review Process

### Commissioning by Warwickshire County Council

The review was commissioned by Warwickshire County Council at its meeting of 20 March 2018. At that meeting the Leader of the Council, Councillor Izzi Seccombe made the following statement.

'Members will be aware that the opening of Kenilworth Station is imminent and much welcomed. There is no doubting the economic benefits the station will bring to the town and surrounding area, as well as the travel links to the wider Midlands. We have been waiting for this station for over 50 years.

Members will also be aware that there have been difficulties in getting to the opening date and that we have had problems with delays. The station is a very complex project, much more complex than the opening of parkway stations of which we have delivered several successfully over the years.

None of us, as members of this council, colleagues in other authorities, or in the community, are happy with this situation. There are, no doubt, learning points for all concerned and to that end I am proposing the establishment of a scrutiny TFG to look into what problems have beset the opening of Kenilworth Station. I propose that we extend our invitation to our partners to participate, in particular Kenilworth Town Council; Rail Consultants SLC Rail; Network Rail; the Department for Transport and others that may be necessary as we progress.

I would welcome the support of you as councillors in establishing this Task and Finish Group under the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee.'

The review was agreed to by Council.

## The Task and Finish Group

To undertake the review a cross-party Task and Finish Group (TFG) was established comprising elected members from Warwickshire County Council and Kenilworth Town Council and an Independent Chair.

Membership:

- John Bridgeman CBE (Independent Chair)
- Councillor Richard Chattaway (Warwickshire County Council)
- Councillor Alan Cockburn (Warwickshire County Council)
- Councillor Michael Coker (Kenilworth Town Council)
- Councillor Bill Gifford (Warwickshire County Council)
- Councillor Wallace Redford (Warwickshire County Council)
- Councillor Adrian Warwick (Warwickshire County Council)

John Bridgeman is one of the country's most experienced figures in public interest inquiries in both the public and private sectors. With a background in industry culminating in appointment as CEO of British Alcan Aluminium plc, John served for six years on the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and five years as Director General of the Office of Fair Trading - the Non-Ministerial Government Department responsible for Competition Policy and Consumer Protection. He has been Chair of the County Council's Audit and Standards Committee since 2000.

It is important to note that from the outset representatives of Kenilworth Town Council were engaged in the review process. Their attendance at meetings and their contribution to discussion was most useful.

The TFG was supported by officers from the Resources Directorate (legal advice and secretariat) and Communities Directorate (significant input from transport planners).

To further provide a degree of balance an independent rail advisor, Chris Kimberley, was commissioned to support the review by bringing his extensive knowledge of the rail industry and rail infrastructure construction projects to the table. In the past he has undertaken senior operational management, business planning and project lead roles, the latter including the successful bids for the Northern Rail and Caledonian Sleeper multi-million pound outsourced operations and maintenance passenger rail franchise contracts. Most recently Chris Kimberley was Director of Rail Operations at HS2 Ltd.

## The Process

In order to give structure to the review a process was established that would help ensure that all sources of evidence were explored and that the information gathered was used to the best effect. This section explains some of the key elements of that process.

## Terms of Reference

The TFG commenced its work by producing terms of reference (Appendix A). These serve to establish the aims and objectives of the review, the nature and sources of evidence that will be required and the review boundaries that serve to maintain a degree of focus.

Of particular note within the terms of reference are:

- a) The remit of the TFG which “is to explore the process leading to the opening of the Kenilworth Railway Station and to identify what lessons can be learned for future rail projects focusing on the following themes”:
  - (i) Project design and sign off and reasons for/impact of subsequent changes
  - (ii) Project planning and project management arrangements
  - (ii) Project delivery and sign off and the foreseeability of any complications during implementation
  - (iii) Partnership working arrangements, the role of different agencies their industry processes and any associated impact on project delivery
  - (v) The social and economic impacts of the revised opening date
- b) Those elements of the project that are not considered appropriate for the review to cover, namely:
  - (i) Funding arrangements for the Kenilworth railway station
  - (ii) Contractual and/or other agreements which remain the subject of negotiation

*A consequence of this is that the role of the construction contractor is not examined in this review and the contractor was not asked to take part, and statements as to events and causes should be read subject to this qualification. However, this has not affected the ability of this review to consider the lessons to be learned from all other aspects of the management of the project and working with partners.*

- c) Partners in the Kenilworth Station project whose input would be required if a comprehensive understanding was to be established. These are:
  - SLC Rail (WCC’s rail consultants)
  - Network Rail
  - Department for Transport (rail section)
  - West Midlands Trains (train operator)
  - Office of Rail and Road (ORR)



## Lines of Inquiry

At its first full meeting held in July 2018 the TFG agreed ten lines of inquiry. These are fundamental to the review as they identify those areas of interest that it is considered are key to understanding the issues at hand.

1. The Role of Network Rail
2. The Role of SLC Rail
3. The Role of ORR
4. The Role of DfT
5. The Role of West Midland Trains
6. Basis for estimating first station opening date
7. Economic, Social and Reputational Damage
8. The Role of WCC's Project Board & Major Schemes Board
9. The WCC Procurement Process for a Rail Contract
10. Critical self-examination within Warwickshire County Council

As information was considered so it became clear that a further line of inquiry was required. This was around communication between partners, Kenilworth town organisations and with the wider community.

For lines of inquiry 1 to 5 (above) a short series of questions was prepared by officers of the County Council (agreed by the TFG) and sent to contacts at the partner organisations. The evidence provided forms the basis of the many of the group's findings and conclusions.

Other lines of inquiry were explored with officers at the TFG meetings. Again the findings from these are given later in this report.

## Full Task and Finish Group Meetings

A number of meetings of the TFG were held to consider evidence drawn from the lines of inquiry. The meetings enabled evidence to be considered in-depth with expert professional advice being provided by officers. Detailed records of these meetings were made.

## Site Visit

On the day of its first meeting (which was held in Kenilworth) the TFG members undertook a visit to Kenilworth Station. There, as well as gaining an impression of the station, they were able to speak to staff and passengers and appreciate the benefits the station is bringing to rail travellers. Members were also shown aspects of the station build that had led in part to the challenges faced immediately prior to opening.

## Press Release

To be certain that the wider community was aware that this review is being undertaken a press release was produced and circulated to a range of local media. Consideration was given as to whether it should also be sent to specialist rail industry and enthusiast publications. It was however decided that this was unnecessary.

## **Meeting with Other Warwickshire County Councillors**

Although the TFG is small comprising six, cross party, elected members (five from Warwickshire County Council and one Kenilworth Town Council) it was acknowledged early on that other members of the County Council may have views regarding the Kenilworth Station project that they might wish to share. To facilitate this, a meeting was held on 10 September 2018 to which all members of the County Council were invited. The meeting, attended by six County Councillors, proved to be useful in that it enabled them to learn more about the review and share their views on the Kenilworth Station project and other such schemes that may be proposed for the future. Questions to the Chair were invited in advance of the meeting to enable the maximum benefit to be drawn from the meeting.

## **Meetings with Partners**

From the start it was considered that it would be of mutual benefit if members of the TFG could meet with representatives from partner organisations. This has been of great value. We were able to ask them their views of the Kenilworth Station Project; what they felt had gone well and what they would have done differently. It is clear from those spoken to that there is a strong desire to work as effectively and efficiently as possible.

## **Meetings with Warwickshire County Council Officers – Past and Present**

A number of County Council officers have made valuable contributions which have assisted members in understanding the complexity of the project that was undertaken. In addition, two former employees of the County Council who are now retired met with the Chair to share their experience with this and other related schemes. Although they had left the authority before the station in Kenilworth was opened they brought to the review many years of experience working with transport-related projects and partners.

## **Public Questionnaire**

A questionnaire was produced by officers within the Communities Directorate of WCC and placed at Kenilworth Station and Kenilworth Library. The purpose of the questionnaire was to give people an opportunity to express their views over the delays to the opening of the station and also to tell the County Council about their use of the new facility.

## 1.2 The Kenilworth Station Project

Before relating the main body of evidence considered by the TFG it is worth considering why Kenilworth Station was built, what has been delivered and how the scheme was funded.

### a) Objectives

As has already been mentioned, the new Kenilworth Station was first given serious consideration in 2008 but it was five years before funding could be secured. The objectives for the project were and remain:

#### **A. Improving access to development sites that have the potential to create jobs**

The scheme supports public-transport access to around 33,000 new jobs which are planned in the Coventry and Warwickshire LEP Area up to 2030, including Friargate (15,300 jobs) and Coventry city centre (3,378 jobs).

A wider economic appraisal of Kenilworth Station scheme was undertaken for WCC by consultants SQW. The SQW work projected that: -

- the effect of the Kenilworth Station scheme is expected to result in an additional 785 jobs on development sites in the corridor by 2020, compared to the situation where it did not occur;
- based on assumptions about the average additional GVA per worker, the potential increase in sub-regional GVA to be worth approximately £30.6 million per annum (2010 prices) by 2020.

#### **B. Improving access to urban employment centres**

- the rail station at Kenilworth directly served the local markets for rail travel to the urban employment centres of Coventry and Leamington Spa;
- access is also be provided to urban employment centres further afield including London and Birmingham, Oxford and Reading via a single interchange.

#### **C. Easing congestion**

- by providing increased rail capacity on an over-crowded section of the Cross Country network between Leamington and Coventry;
- by promoting modal shift away from road to rail, reducing congestion on the road corridors between Kenilworth and Coventry and Kenilworth and Leamington. Over the 60 year appraisal period of the scheme Economic Case, it is estimated that some 224 million car kilometres will

be saved from the local and strategic road networks through passengers switching from road to rail. Assuming that 23mg of NO<sub>x</sub> are emitted per vehicle km<sup>3</sup>, this would relate to a saving of up to 5,150kg NO<sub>x</sub> over the 60 year appraisal period.

## b) The Station

In December 2013 Warwickshire County Council's Cabinet approved the actions required for the implementation of the project.

The scope of these works included the detailed design, approvals, construction and commissioning of the proposed facility to include the following;

- Station building including ticket office, café and eating area with accessible toilet
- Equality Act compliant footbridge with lifts
- 2 platforms to accommodate 4 car trains (Subsequently changed following Hendy Review)
- Steps and ramps to the platform adjacent to the station building
- Platform waiting shelters
- Highway access onto Priory Road
- Car parking at the south end of the proposed site which includes 5 blue badge parking bays adjacent to the ticket office
- Separate motorcycle parking and covered bicycle parking adjacent to the new station
- Separate taxi facility and bus stand, for 1 bus to set down and pick up and turning area
- Retention of existing right of way footbridge and electrical sub-station
- Customer information, safety and ticketing systems



*Clearing the Site 2016*

Tendering for the contract was undertaken in an OJEU (Official Journal of the European Union) compliant manner in order to achieve best value for money and in accordance with the County Council's Contract Standing Orders. The submissions were evaluated against predetermined assessment criteria, a combination of both price and quality.



*The New Station September 2017*

To enable the planned train service to operate to the proposed timetable, it was recognised that some infrastructure works would be required to the existing line in

the vicinity of the new station and also at Leamington Station.

On the 13 May 2014 the Council's Regulatory Committee approved Outline Planning Permission. On the 10 February 2015 the Council's Regulatory Committee approved the Reserved Matters Planning Application.

In October 2014, a consultation exercise was conducted to provide the residents the opportunity to have their say on the station design. 72% of the residents were in favour of the 'Heritage' design.

The project was divided into three overlapping sections namely,

- Station Build
- Interventions (Alterations to the rail infrastructure)
- Service Provision

### **C) Funding**

Funding for the Kenilworth Station scheme came from three different sources as set out in the table below.

Funding Source	
WCC Capital Programme	£4.853m
New Stations Fund	£4.900m
Coventry & Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership	£3.490m
<b>TOTAL SCHEME FUNDING (Capital)</b>	<b>£13.243m</b>
<b>WCC contingency</b>	<b>£0.373m</b>

It is expected that the project will have been delivered on-budget having taken account of pre-planned contingencies. (See Appendix B for examples of other stations supported by the New Stations Fund).

#### **D) Services**

As at February 2019 Kenilworth Station there is an hourly service operating between Leamington Spa and Coventry Monday to Saturday. This is provided by West Midlands Trains using a single car diesel unit. Up until the end of August 2018 there had been a total of 58,730 passenger journeys to/from Kenilworth Station (average 587 per day).

## 2. Evidence

This section sets out the basic facts behind the project, how it was managed and the reasons behind the delays to opening.

Some of the information considered relates not to the period between the completion of the station and its opening (that being the primary focus of this review) but to the earlier stages. This is included to provide some background and also to illustrate that what might appear a simple building operation can be very complex.

### 2.1 Key Partners and Stakeholders in the Kenilworth Station Project

In order to appreciate the complexity of the Kenilworth Station project it is important to understand the roles of the various partners engaged in it. Throughout the project the principal driver, Warwickshire County Council, worked with a wide range of individuals and organisations to get the best outcome. These included other local authorities including Kenilworth Town Council, statutory undertakers and community groups. Most work however was carried out by the following:

- Warwickshire County Council
- Network Rail
- West Midlands Trains
- Office of Road and Rail
- Department for Transport
- SLC Rail (Rail project advisers)
- John Graham Construction Ltd (builders of the station)

Outside partners brought their views on the project to the table and this evidence is provided later in this report.

#### Warwickshire County Council

Comprising 57 elected County Councillors and employing around 5500 people the County Council provides a wide range of services including social care, public health, education and learning, libraries and transport. With particular reference to transport the Council oversees maintenance of the highway network, coordinates bus services and has a strategic role in the delivery of rail related infrastructure such as stations. In recent years, the County Council has been behind the commissioning of several new stations. Kenilworth Station was its latest completion. Early work is underway on at least one more (Rugby Parkway).

That the County Council is using public money to provide services means that it must always strive to be as open and transparent as possible. It is also bound by the basic tenets of democracy to be fair and equitable. This means that before it can embark on a major project such as Kenilworth Station it must be convinced that it is doing the right thing in the context of its approved strategic objectives and policies. In addition, as the guardian of public money the Council must agree on the best approach.

In order to manage strategic transport projects, the County Council operates a series of accountable bodies. Each plays a distinct but interrelated role. It is important that

everyone on these bodies has a clear understanding of their own contribution and performs accordingly.

For the Kenilworth Station project, Warwickshire County Council acted as the principal driver, developing and promoting the scheme, obtaining the necessary funding and acting as project sponsor.

The major challenge that faced the County Council was to manage all the partners whilst achieving their combined goals within budget and matching public expectations.

## SLC Rail

SLC Rail was appointed by Warwickshire County Council to provide expert knowledge and support for the Kenilworth Station project. The company is based in Birmingham and has an extensive portfolio supporting national government, local authorities and the rail industry. Its team members have held key leadership roles at Chiltern Railways, Chiltern's then shareholder John Laing plc and at SLC itself for delivery of all 4 other Warwickshire new stations in partnership with the County Council - Warwick Parkway - 2000 (Chiltern); Coleshill Parkway – 2007 (Laing); Stratford-upon-Avon Parkway - 2011 (SLC Rail); Bermuda Park (and Coventry Arena) -2016 (SLC Rail).

To the project SLC Rail brought the following:

- Development, alongside Warwickshire CC officers, of the Kenilworth project's strategy, business case, financial and commercial models, funding assembly (including preparation of the successful £4.9 million New Stations Fund bid in 2013), train timetable and performance assessment, rolling stock identification, rail industry stakeholder engagement, DfT-negotiations and progress of the scheme through the full 8 stages of Network Rail's 'Governance of Railway Investment Projects' (GRIP) process
- Project Manager - Coordinating overall project delivery (construction and train service implementation) to budget, programme and risks within the WCC governance framework
- Planner – Monitoring Contractor's programme and managed the Employer's programme
- Commercial Manager – Assisting the Project Manager in administering the contract
- Design Manager – Overseeing the Contractor's design process and coordinating the design submissions for consents/approvals. Supervising the construction to ensure works are delivered to approved design and Network Rail Standards
- Construction Manager – Monitors Contractor construction practices including quality and Health and Safety standards.
- Mechanical & Electrical Clerk of Works – Monitors Contractor construction to ensure these discipline specific works are in accordance with approved design and Network Rail Standards

One of the principal roles for SLC Rail was the oversight of the work of the contractors, Grahams Construction.




## Network Rail

Network Rail owns the infrastructure, including the railway tracks, signals, overhead wires, tunnels, bridges, level crossings and most stations, but not the passenger or commercial freight rolling stock. Although it owns over 2,500 railway stations, it manages only 18 of them, all the other stations being managed by one or other of the various train operating companies.

With a budget of around £6.5bn Network Rail has around 800 rail infrastructure projects running at any one time. These can range from minor maintenance work to major reconfiguration of the network.

For the Kenilworth Station project Network Rail was responsible for the works relating to the railway line and associated infrastructure. (It is also required to take over responsibility for the station and must therefore be satisfied that it has been built to a suitable standard).

The challenges that faced Network Rail with Kenilworth Station were not unusual; making certain that the changes made to accommodate the new station were undertaken in a timely, efficient and compliant fashion whilst causing a minimum of disruption to other service users.



*Slewing the Track Through the Station  
October 2017*

Evidence presented to the group regarding Network Rail has provided a picture of a very large and busy organisation that, charged with maintaining a complex and ageing rail network, has a very difficult task on its hands.

## West Midlands Trains

West Midlands Trains is the train operating company that now serves Kenilworth Station. It is a consortium of three companies: Abellio, JR East and Mitsui.

West Midlands Trains took over the franchise from London Midland on 10 December 2017 at a time when Kenilworth Station was due to come into operation.

For West Midlands Trains to operate the service it was required to recruit and train staff and secure the use of adequate rolling stock. Their operations are complex and require careful timing if staff are not to be appointed and then left waiting as the project has not been signed-off.

## Department for Transport

The Department for Transport is an arm of government with an annual budget of around £6bn. It has four strategic objectives:

- Sustain economic growth and improved productivity through reliable and efficient transport networks;
- Improve the environmental performance of transport;

- Strengthen the safety and security of transport; and
- Enhance access to jobs, services, and social networks, including for the most disadvantaged people.

The department creates the strategic framework for transport services, which are delivered through a wide range of public and private sector bodies including its own executive agencies.

The Department for Transport, whilst having an oversight of the Kenilworth Station project was not directly involved in its delivery. As a strategic body, however, the policies it generated and changes it made did impact on progress with the project. Some fundamental aspects of the original scheme were changed as a direct result of changes to policy.

### **Office of Road and Rail (ORR)**

The ORR is a non-ministerial government department responsible for the economic and safety regulation of Britain's railways, and the economic monitoring of Highways England.

ORR regulates Network Rail by setting its activities and funding requirements for each Control Period, ensuring train operators have fair access to the railway network, and enforcing compliance with its network licence. ORR is the competition authority for the railways and enforces consumer protection law in relation to the railways.

ORR has regulatory oversight to ensure that the industry's requirements in respect of non-discriminatory access to facilities is upheld and in assuring the necessary safety standards have been met.

### **Graham Group Construction**


The Principal Contractor (Graham Group Construction) is a large organisation employing around 2200 people. It was selected using a competitive tendering process following an OJEU compliant procurement process. The Contractor was mandatorily required to demonstrate appropriate accreditations for the works requirements (through the Network Rail approved rail industry accreditation scheme), assessed against quality criteria including Health and Safety and Industry experience and references were provided. The Contractor was thus selected based on its demonstrable ability to deliver the design and construction of the project.

## **2.2 Governance and Support Arrangements**

The Kenilworth Station project was managed through a project governance hierarchy in accordance with PRINCE 2 Project Management Framework. This served to ensure oversight and accountability at all levels.

This governance arrangement has been developed on the basis of experiences with other major capital projects undertaken over the last 20 years or so in Warwickshire. It has been reported that whilst the hierarchy is clearly defined there are few if any barriers to communication between the various tiers. It is considered important that if the project manager feels compelled to speak with members of the Major Schemes Board then she is readily able to do so.

The governance hierarchy used is given below.



The Major Schemes Board operates at a strategic level. Its terms of reference require it to focus principally on whether projects are on target time wise and financially.

The purpose of the Kenilworth Station Project Board was to:

1. Ensure delivery to time and budget
2. Ensure funding was in place to deliver the Project
3. Provide governance and quality assurance to the Major Schemes Board
4. Guide and direct the Project Management Group on all relevant Project matters

The purpose of the Project Management Group was to:

1. Oversee and manage development of the Project to completion of GRIP8
2. Manage budget, programme, cost and risk
3. Submit periodic progress reports to the Project Board
4. Make recommendations for decisions outside the delegated authority of the PMG

## 5. Manage change control and ensure quality assurance

### Sub Groups

A number of sub groups were established to further support the process.

- **Communications Sub Group**

Meeting on a monthly basis to discuss communication and marketing opportunities. To report any decisions to PMG.

- **Finance Sub Group**

Meeting on a monthly basis to monitor the budget and funding. To report any decisions to PMG or the Project Board.

- **Monthly Contractor Progress Meeting**

Meeting on a monthly basis to review the design submission and approvals, progress of the construction works, health and safety matters arising, discharge of consents, programme and possessions update, manage issues and risks, review any stakeholder issues, review any commercial matters arising and to generally oversee the management of the contract.

- **Contract Management Sub Group**

Meeting on a monthly basis to oversee the management of the contract including Early Warning Notices, Project Manager Instructions, Notifications of Compensation Events (CEs) received, method of assessment of CEs, PM Compensation Events, Risk Register, Payments. To propose decisions to be made for the PMG or the Project Board.

## 2.3 Accountability

One of the key areas explored by the TFG has been accountability. The question was asked who was ultimately responsible for the delivery of the project and who was responsible for the delivery of the various stages that culminated in that success.

### Accountability within Warwickshire County Council.

Ultimately it is the Leader who is responsible for all aspects of the County Council's work and service delivery. In practice many of the decisions made are delegated to her Portfolio Holders or to officers. The governance arrangements as set out above for the Kenilworth Station project begin to give a sense of how decision making and accountability cascades downwards and upwards.

## Accountability with and Across Partner Organisations.

The Kenilworth Station project, although seemingly small on a national level, was complex and relied on a range of partners to fulfil the tasks set them. Failure by one partner to meet their deadline would have a knock on effect on others.



*Bridge Lift July 2017*

A major function for SLC Rail was to oversee the work of Grahams Construction. The SLC Rail team ensured that the Contractor was scrutinised through the following activities:

- During the design phase, the Design Manager chaired fortnightly progress meetings with the Contractor and their designer in order to oversee the quality of the designs being produced and to ensure that the contractor was following the Network Rail design approval process.
- When designs were submitted, SLC Rail carried out a review of the designs alongside the Network Rail review and provided formal comments for each discipline (Civil, Mechanical and Electrical)
- The Contractor was required to produce a formal monthly progress report to update the Employer on all aspects of the project. The reports were presented to both SLC Rail, the County Council, Network Rail and London Midland in a monthly progress meeting.
- The Contractor was required to submit programmes for acceptance every month. The programme submissions were scrutinised by SLC Rail and the Contractor was asked to justify any delay presented in the programme.
- In addition, during construction the Contractor was requested to submit weekly 'look ahead' programmes with further detail of the weekly activities. SLC Rail reviewed the programme as part of the SLC Rail weekly team meeting on site to monitor the Contractor's performance against the planned activities.
- During the construction period, SLC Rail had representation on site on a daily basis. SLC Rail checked the quality of construction against the approved design. Quality Issues were identified, logged & progressed to both the County Council's and Network Rail's satisfaction.

- SLC Rail also ensured that the works were being constructed in a safe manner and in accordance with the limitations of the Asset Protection Agreement between Network Rail and the County Council
- Construction Phase Plans and Work Package Plans (Method Statements and RAMS) were submitted to both Network Rail and SLC Rail for approval prior to works commencing on site. In addition, the SLC Rail Design Manager ensured that any temporary works designs were checked and signed off at the appropriate level.
- Regular Risk reduction meetings were held with Contractor to review the Early Warning raised by either party under the contract. SLC Rail and the Contractor discussed appropriate mitigations for each Early Warning raised.
- Regular commercial meetings were held with the contractor to review and agree payment applications, Instructions, quotations and Compensation Events. Contractual correspondence was managed by the SLC Rail Project Manager and Commercial Manager using an online tool provided by the Contractor (Viewpoint). Programme submissions were also submitted via Viewpoint.

## 2.4. Timeline of Key Decisions, Complications and Delays

This section explains many of the complications encountered by Warwickshire County Council and its partners as it worked to deliver the new station. It is important to bear in mind that complicating factors do not always present themselves as a sequence of events. Some challenges can be concurrently present at any one time. This means that if delays are already being caused by one issue a second issue that arises may not add to the overall delay as it can be resolved quickly. (See diagram at Appendix C).

The reader is referred to the evidence provided by key partners during evidence gathering meetings. This serves to provide greater detail on the points set out below.

*This section does not, however, assess the role of the construction contractor.*

### Government Policy (Hendy Review)

#### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

December 2016 to May 2017

The Hendy Review led to a four-and-a-half-month delay in the Kenilworth Station project. In September 2015, The Secretary of State asked Sir Peter Hendy (Chair of Network Rail) to conduct a review of the Network Rail enhancement programme in England and Wales to see what can be delivered in an affordable and timely way within the funding period to 2019 (Control Period 5). In November 2015, the Hendy Review was released. Prior to the Hendy Review, double tracking works between Leamington and Coventry were due to be delivered within Control Period 5 (2014-2019).

Kenilworth Station was therefore planned to be built with 2 platforms to future proof for the planned double tracking.

As a result of the Hendy Review, there was no commitment within the report to deliver the double tracking works from Leamington to Coventry within Control Period 5 (2014-2019) or Control Period 6 (2020-2025).

Due to the length of time between station construction and double tracking the responsibility for the day to day maintenance of a constructed platform 2 would not be accepted by the Station Facility Owner and as such, Network Rail could not accept it as an asset. In addition, the public perception of the second platform in place without a track or train service for over 10 years would be an unacceptable reputational risk for all parties.

As a result, after discussions with the DfT, it was confirmed that the project would include the provision of the footbridge as part of the station development. This would ensure that a fully accessible facility was provided from the opening of the station for all of the residents of Kenilworth.

Once this was eventually confirmed, DfT, Network Rail and the County Council agreed to remove the second platform from the station project scope. A resubmission of the designs was therefore required due to the amendments needed to remove the second platform. The scope of the amendments had to be agreed with Network Rail and Mott MacDonald to deliver the design changes. This in turn delayed the signature of the contract between the County Council and Network Rail (Asset Protection Agreement) and the Design and Build contract; the preferred bidder adjusted their price for the delay and winter working. The contract completion date moved from December 2016 to May 2017.

It has been suggested that in hindsight the County Council and partners should have reconsidered the entire programme at this stage (including the train operation and timetable impact) and announced the potential delay until the consequences of the Hendy announcement were fully understood. However, the County Council and SLC Rail were not fully appreciative of the subsequent problems being faced by NR. However, the Council appreciates the timescale was a challenge but still keen to deliver.

### Interface with Interventions Project

#### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

May 2017 to August 2017

A reported shortage of Network Rail resources resulted in prolonged design review periods and deficiencies in their existing asset information resulted in works being re-sequenced stopping whilst a culvert was surveyed to update NR asset register. A proposal for a temporary or demountable platform (post Hendy) led to distraction and disruption.

## Operational Matters (rolling stock)

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

May 2017 to August 2017

London Midland confirmed the cascade of a 153 train unit from GWR to arrive in June 2017 and enter into service August 2017. The timetable had to be remodelled due to Cross County being granted additional paths on a Sunday (despite Kenilworth having been signed off).

## Interventions Project

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

May 2017 to August 2017

Lack of availability of signalling records and other issues led to an adjusted planned completion date of August 2017.

## Interventions Project- Kenilworth Loop and Track Slew works

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

August 2017 to December 2017

Network Rail confirmed that the Kenilworth Loop Works required to allow the new shuttle service to operate, were not included in their programme of works, in November 2016. Network Rail confirmed these would not be delivered for August 2017. Following consideration of demountable platform, track slew delayed to October 2017.

## Franchise Considerations (rolling stock)

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

December 2017- February 2018

The West Midland Rail franchise with London Midland expired in October 2017 which meant that the opening date of the station went over the London Midland franchise period. This had implications on the planned arrangements with London Midland as previously agreed. The franchise was awarded to West Midlands Trains; however it became clear that under the new franchise arrangements, the availability of suitable rolling stock and the availability of trained drivers and conductors would not be ready in time for a December opening date delaying the opening beyond December 2017.



## ORR approval

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

December 2017 to February 2018

The submission of the Common Safety Method (CSM) and Interoperability documentation to the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) was protracted as the station and the track slew project were originally split in their CSM categorisation. The Systems Review Panel (SRP) expressed concerns over the fact that the projects were split and had different CSM categorisation. The categorisation for both projects became categorised the same (significant), increasing the status of the track slew project. This resulted in additional evidence required by Network Rail interventions project.

## Entry into Service approval

### **Impact on the Kenilworth Station Project:**

February 2018 to April 2018

In order for the station and the facilities to be taken into service and used by the public, the rail industry conducts an Entry in Service approval process before an official handover take places. On-site inspections are carried out by specialist project engineers from a range of disciplines (Civils, Mechanical & Engineering, Telecoms) from within NR to assess the new asset for safe functional operation. This proved to be a protracted process that required the contractor to make amendments to the station build to meet the requirements.

A number of inspections were carried out before a final inspection took place on 26 April 2018 where the handover documents were signed ready for the service to commence on 30 April 2018.

## 2.5 Funding

The extent and sources of funding for the project has been referenced early in this report. The TFG has learned that the funding provided by the Coventry and Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership was time limited and payments related to fixed milestones. Whilst such an approach works to maintain pressure for project completion there is evidence that those involved in directing the Kenilworth Station scheme felt unreasonably rushed at times into making decisions.

## 2.6 Economic and Social Impact of Delays to the Opening and Reputational Damage

The evidence for this section has been drawn from the results of the questionnaire circulated in September 2018. Full results from the questionnaire can be found at

Appendix D but the following are those points pertaining to people's perception of the impact to them of delays in the stations opening. Overall the reported impacts were minor or moderate. Few respondents reported any significant impact.

#### **No impact / minor impact**

72% of respondents (93 responses) indicated that the delayed station opening had no impact or a minor impact on them. The description of minor impacts are summarised below:

- More convenient way to travel / couldn't use trains (9 responses);
- Increased cost of commute (7 responses);
- Deferred journeys / changed plans (7 responses);
- Continued to use bus service (5 responses);
- Continued to use other stations (3 responses);
- Had to use car (2 responses);
- Annoying / disappointed (2 responses);
- Showed up local authority (1 response);
- Not knowing reason for delay (1 response);
- Wasn't there before so limited impact (1 response);
- Risk of losing interest / support for project (1 response).

#### **Moderate impact**

Just under a quarter of respondents (23%/30 responses) stated that the delay had resulted in a moderate impact. The description of moderate impacts are summarised below:

- Increased cost of commute (11 responses);
- Unable to travel by train (5 responses);
- Continued to use bus service (5 responses);
- Deferred journeys / plans had to be changed (4 responses);
- Nuisance / frustrated by wait (3 responses);
- Had to use other stations (1 response);
- Had to drive (1 response);
- Couldn't progress in job (1 response);
- Couldn't use for school or to see friends (1 response).

#### **Severe impact**

Just under 5% of respondents (6 responses) stated the impact of the delayed station opening was severe. The description of severe impacts are listed below:

- Purchased a rail card to be used in February. Due to delay this went unused for several months. Had to use bus services to get to work which cost more money (1 response);
- Had to use car for commute (1 response);
- Missed last bus and had to get a taxi a number of times (1 response);
- Continued to use the bus service (1 response);
- Couldn't travel by train to Coventry. Had to take a 45 minute bus journey (1 response);
- Now it's opened, missing connecting trains to Nuneaton and Coventry (1 response).

The TFG has considered the issue of reputational damage. Certainly during the period between the completion of the station building and the introduction of services there was degree of frustration expressed by some members of the community. The public questionnaire did not ask for views on how happy people are with the station now that it is open but with ever increasing patronage there is a sense that any damage that may have occurred in April 2018 was short lived.

## 2.7 Communications Regarding the Planned Opening of the Station

The TFG has considered evidence from the officers of the Warwickshire County Council Marketing and Communications Team as well as representatives from partner organisations and again the results of the questionnaire survey.

Communication on the project took a number of different forms either through social media, the local press or directly with groups such as the Friends of Kenilworth Station. In addition, the contractors building the station liaised with neighbours in an effort to make sure they were kept abreast of progress.

Early communications releases were undertaken jointly with partners. Monthly information management meetings were held with those partners to ensure that unified messages were presented to the public. However, over time a pattern developed where most information releases were led by the County Council. Attendance by partners at the monthly information management meetings tailed off towards the completion of the project meaning that public perceptions regarding progress with it were largely focussed on the work of the County Council.

The TFG has learned that many capital build projects avoid the announcement of a proposed opening date as was the case for Kenilworth Station. Rather, they announce opening in a season e.g. Autumn 2019. This may be appropriate for highway projects but very often new rail services are introduced on the day rail timetables change. For this reason, it is sometimes considered preferable to pin opening down to a particular date.

Another reason for identifying a date for opening is that it can be used as a lever to ensure that partners continue to drive towards completion.

The TFG has heard of two further aspects of communications which it is considered could have been approached differently.

- i) This report has already alluded to the complexity of the Kenilworth Station project involving not only the construction of a new station but also the introduction of a new train service. It is considered that the extent of this complexity was not effectively conveyed to the public. As a result many people imagined that the task being faced was simply to construct a station and platform. If people had had a greater appreciation of the situation they may have felt less frustration.
- ii) The complexity of the scheme should have been relayed to funding partners such as the Local Enterprise Partnership.

The results of the public questionnaire demonstrate a significant reliance by people on local press/radio to keep them up to date on local events. Whilst WCC is in control of the press release, WCC can't control the message that the media puts out.



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The use of the type of language used in announcements concerning the opening has been considered. Representatives of the County Council were, it appears, keen to offer assurances which, although well founded at the time they were given, could not it transpired be met. A better approach may have been to caveat announcements, not to confuse the message but to make clear the complexity of the

environment the project was being delivered in. Had people understood how reliant agencies charged with delivering the project were on each other they may have been more prepared to accept the delays encountered.

## 2.8 Lessons Identified and Learning Lessons

There is a clear distinction between “lessons identified” and “lessons learned”. It is easy to recognise that something should be done differently in the future but the key is to act on that.

### Lessons Identified

The TFG considered whether Warwickshire County Council had learned lessons from previous capital transport projects (both rail and road related), what it had done to use those lessons and what it needs to do in the future to ensure that it benefits from past experience.

The County Council has a good track record of delivering large scale transport schemes. Since 1989 it has either been involved with or directly led on the opening of six railway stations as well as the construction of a number of new highways or improvements to existing ones.

From each of these schemes officers and members have sought to capture the experiences in the expectation that future schemes can benefit.

There is strong evidence that many of the processes that are followed by the Council today are the result of previous experience. For example, the governance structure used for Kenilworth Station has its roots in the construction of the Rugby Western Relief Road which opened in 2010.

The Council is not unique in seeking to learn lessons from the past. It is now accepted practice within the transport construction industry to undertake an evaluation of each scheme once it has been completed. The TFG examined examples of such reviews to gain an understanding of the extent to which project leads feel able to reflect on any shortcomings or good practices.

## Lessons Learned

With lessons learned there are two key considerations to bear in mind.

1. No two schemes are the same. The lessons learned in one instance may not apply to the next. This is particularly the case with rail infrastructure schemes where many more partners are involved in successful delivery than with highway schemes. Politics, finance and environmental considerations can all conspire to complicate matters and undermine a project's ability to draw on the past for answers.
2. Where lessons are learned in one scheme they must not be forgotten or lost. It is too easy to launch a new major scheme without investing the time early on to take stock of past experience. In recent years, as staff levels have been reduced and experienced employees lost to the County Council so the need to build up that knowledge base of past projects becomes even more important.

## 2.9 Evidence from our Partners

This review has been fortunate in that representatives from a number of partners were able to share their experience with the TFG and provide a picture of how they regarded the project. As well as providing observations our partners were able to make suggestions on how processes could be improved. These too are set out in this section.

The reader should bear in mind that the evidence provided is based on partners' perceptions. There may be times when agencies have slightly divergent views. This, it is suggested, is understandable given the scale and complexity of the project.

### 2.9.1 Evidence Provided by SLC Rail

Contributing Officers:

Ian Walters – Managing Director SLC Rail

Ian Baxter – Director SLC Rail

## General Comments

1. The Kenilworth Station project was made complicated by a series of circumstances and challenges all of which need to be addressed. That the project succeeded is remarkable. It straddled a change in franchise, required a

wholly new train service, was set on a single line section on a major inter-city and freight route with two significant adjacent junction stations at Leamington and Coventry, it involved many partners and it found a way to proceed despite the impact of the Hendy Review. This is too easily forgotten.

2. When the station was first considered it was necessary to reflect on whether the benefits it would bring to Kenilworth would outweigh the capital costs of the additional works required at Leamington Spa, Coventry and for the signalling on the Kenilworth Loop. The Department for Transport and Network Rail agreed to deliver the infrastructure work (signalling) with the quid pro quo being that WCC would deliver the second platform at the station (building all the station at once to save this having to be delivered by the route doubling project). This was in WCC's interest, as it removed some of the more complex scope from the WCC scheme but at the same time it removed from SLC and WCC a degree of control from the overall project interface. These infrastructure works being delivered by Network Rail at Leamington and on the Kenilworth Loop made a contribution to national rail network operation, rather than being specifically for the Kenilworth scheme. Changes to the signalling arrangements served to increase capacity and offer performance benefits on the route, this in turn has benefitted Cross Country and rail freight operators.
3. It is important to reflect on how the rail industry supports third parties. Sometimes their interests seem to be forgotten. For example, in 2014 the Rail Regulator (Office of Road and Rail – ORR) failed to consult WCC on Cross Country service changes to the Sunday Only timetable for the Leamington-Kenilworth-Coventry route that set the pattern for the current absence of Sunday Kenilworth service, notwithstanding WCC's subsequent correspondence with the ORR. There appears to be nothing in statute to protect the interests of third parties in such circumstances.
4. Greater attention should have been given to the way in which public expectations were managed in terms of the project programme.
5. Network Rail has assisted in enhancing the National Rail network and helped to facilitate the construction of a brand new station. It would have been understandable if Network Rail had been resistant to the project as, as with any new station and train service it necessarily requires changes to already finely balanced operations on a busy and highly utilised piece of the network.
6. Cross Country and the freight operators equally have their own agendas and imperatives. It is important to remember that Kenilworth lies on a UK main route between Bournemouth and Manchester and yet sits between 2 short stretches of single line that acts as both a capacity and performance constraint.
7. There is a risk that as projects progress so partner organisations experience a degree of "loss of corporate memory". This is particularly the case where individuals change over the life of the project. For example, early in the life of the Kenilworth Station project (around 2013) a series of foundation meetings

was undertaken. Further examples of information sharing and the involvement of key agencies throughout the project are:

- a) The **New Stations Fund** bid was supported in writing by all rail industry partners. This formed a comprehensive summary of the rationale for the Kenilworth scheme together with its business case, project structure and programme. Projects develop and change during their lives, but the NSF bid document was available to all formal parties to the Kenilworth project throughout. It might reasonably be said that whilst WCC is indeed responsible for leading a project with the full engagement of stakeholders, those stakeholders also have their own responsibility for how actively they participate, read and understand project documentation, organise communication within their organisation, and how they brief staff when people move on or change jobs.
- b) **Network Rail** – The key early design and specification phase for the station - GRIP 3 Option Selection was undertaken by Atkins for WCC and John Laing plc (at that time a potential investor in the station) as far back as 2010 and 2011 and signed off by Network Rail in May 2011. The further train service timetable analysis at GRIP 3, undertaken for the 2013 NSF Bid was signed off by Network Rail in February 2013. Progression of the scheme then went into their normal GRIP process within Network Rail, and with the Network Rail Sponsor's submission seeking support for progression to GRIP 4 at its March 2013 Investment Panel. Upon submission of the NSF Bid in February 2013, WCC was in routine, regular engagement with the DfT and Network Rail via the monthly New Stations Fund Board. Network Rail provided a letter of support (at senior level) for the New Stations Fund bid in 2013, and subsequently a Network Rail Sponsor, funded by WCC, was allocated to the project throughout the full period of the scheme until its delivery. All appropriate departments of Network Rail, at route level, and national level (such as its National Access Planning Team at Milton Keynes – which manages timetable planning), were fully involved throughout.
- c) **Department for Transport** – The DfT was engaged throughout, both before the submission of the NSF bid in 2012/13, at the time of the bid in 2013, also providing a letter of support, and thence at senior level via the monthly New Stations Fund Board. The DfT was also instrumental in supporting and facilitating the political engagement with the local MP as well as with the Secretary of State for Transport before, during and after the announcement of the success of the NSF Bid in December 2013.

d) **Train Operating Companies**

**London Midland** was involved from the outset of the preparations for and delivery of the New Stations Fund bid in 2013. As with NR and the DfT it provided a letter of support for the bid. It was then closely involved throughout in station specification, as per the normal GRIP processes, and with the ongoing and extensive timetable development and performance modelling processes that were required right up to the ending of its franchise in December 2017.

**Cross Country** were also properly involved, if not from the outset as they were neither calling at nor operating Kenilworth Station, but from the beginnings of the train service development process in 2013 and 2014 (e.g. page 30 reference under 'the Hendy Review' bullet point 2). Bullet 6 on page 47 may be read as suggesting that Cross Country was not engaged effectively, and this was not the case.

**West Midlands Trains** – WMT has been key to the success of the project. However, it is difficult to understand how WMT might have assumed that the Kenilworth service was in operation in the autumn of 2017.

- e) **Politicians and the Public** - Jeremy Wright MP was involved throughout the project, from 2013 onwards, participating in multiple meetings at Westminster with senior DfT, Network Rail and TOC officials, attending site visits and joining the test train runs in 2014. WCC Councillors for Kenilworth, the Portfolio Holder, Kenilworth Town Council members and rail user group representatives attended site visits and the train run, all involving full briefings, with many attending site visits by the Secretary of State for Transport to Kenilworth in 2013 and 2015. A major 3-day public exhibition took place in October 2014 at Kenilworth, attended by WCC, SLC and Rail Industry representatives.

### The Hendy Review

1. It is clear that the Hendy Review led to delays. It also raised concerns that it may not be possible to deliver a service to Kenilworth owing to future demand from operators for paths along the line. In 2013 SLC calculated that it would be possible to run a service, and undertook major and extensive work in revisions to timetable feasibility and performance modelling on multiple occasions thereafter as train services timetables changed each year, on each and every occasion developing a feasible and deliverable train service (as evidenced by the operational train service in 2018).
2. Test running of the service substantively as finally determined took place on the signalling panel at the West Midlands Signalling Centre, with Network Rail, LM and Cross Country in attendance in 2014, together with test runs with a 153



unit. These showed that it would be possible to accommodate the Kenilworth service.

3. The Hendy Review and cancelling of the doubling of the route removed the need for a second platform, which in turn threatened the level of NSF funding. It also meant that it was not possible to award the contract: until funding could be confirmed, revised designs for a station with only a single platform submitted to Network Rail and approved (confirming scope), and the Hendy Review having concluded to ensure infrastructure works that enabled the timetable would be provided (a deliverable of Network Rail).
4. Delays to the award of the contract to 30 March 2016 added four and a half months to the project.
5. If Network Rail had been appointed to deliver the station this would not have removed the impact of the Hendy Review. There is a chance that with Network Rail behind the project Hendy may have stopped it from progressing at all during its review period (when all such similar schemes across the network were halted until the conclusion of the Review).
6. Challenges were also presented regarding changes to the signalling arrangements. Network Rail omitted an element of signalling scope (software modifications to the Kenilworth Loop), which Network Rail were unable to deliver on in the timescale so the opening date of the station was pushed back. All of the above can be attributed to some extent to Hendy.

## Governance and Roles

1. A decision was made early on that the Project Board should not include partners such as Network Rail.
2. Network Rail is in an unusual position in that it is a supplier of services for which it is paid as well as the custodian of the network it operates and maintains, and in many cases also a deliverer of third party funded projects. In other words, it is not just a neutral arbiter but also a commercial operation.
3. A recent development in rail is that project management has moved from the eight stage GRIP system to the five stage Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline as a mechanism for scheme development / progression. (These stages are Determine, Develop, Design, Deliver and Deploy).
4. Network Rail has a valuable role in empowering sponsors. Sponsors are generalists and need assistance in understanding the detail of a project. Network Rail now have Business Development Directors who are responsible for dealing with 3<sup>rd</sup> parties, actively seeking both third party schemes and funding. This is a wholly different industry climate from that during which the Kenilworth scheme was developed and delivered.
5. With regards to Network Rail's early engagement with the scheme, it is important to note that it had been closely involved from the original GRIP3 process, undertaken by John Laing and WCC in 2011, having signed it off.

Network Rail was the formal recipient of the 2013 New Stations Fund bid, and wrote its own letter of support. From 2013 onwards it was involved at every stage of train service and project development through the GRIP process.

6. SLC Rail reported to WCC through several meetings as part of the governance process as follows:
  - Monthly Board Meetings – SLC Rail produced formal report on all aspects of the project including financial, design, construction, operations, programme, issues and top risks
  - Monthly Commercial review – SLC Rail updated WCC on all EWN, Instructions, CEs, Programme submissions, Applications for payment and valuations raised during the previous period. This was an assurance process for WCC to have visibility of all commercial decisions on the project. This meeting feeds into the monthly board meeting under the WCC governance process.
  - Monthly Finance meeting – Review of project account status including invoices/ payments on WCC ledger against capital and revenue budget. This meeting feeds into the monthly board meeting under the WCC governance process.
  - Fortnightly Project Team meetings between WCC and SLC Rail PMs to review all elements of the project. This meeting feeds into the monthly board meeting under the WCC governance process.
  - SLC Rail also provided support to WCC with attendance at regular LEP meetings.

### Change in Franchise

1. The critical timing of the Kenilworth project at the end of the LM franchise and, as originally programmed, just before or at the start of the WMT franchise inevitably affected its progress. It is always challenging for an ending-franchisee to commit as strongly to an enhancement such as Kenilworth at such a point in its franchise life-cycle.
2. The new franchisee (WMT) was very keen to see services introduced at the station. It also mattered to WMT because it naturally would want to be seen positively in its earliest days, and because it is co-managed by both DfT and the West Midlands Rail Executive (WMRE), both committed to the Kenilworth scheme, the DfT via New Stations Fund monies, and WMRE via both policy and WCC being a member of it.
3. The change in franchise from London Midland (LM) to Abellio/West Midlands Trains (WMT) in December 2017 meant that the 153 unit that would have been required for the Coventry-Kenilworth-Leamington service was not leased by LM before its franchise expired. From the information available via the Data Room the new franchisee, WMT, understood that when they took over the stock would

be in place and staff trained. In order to overcome issues WMT began to work with the Department for Transport, to unlock early driver training with LM as incumbent operator. This however did not lead to any resolution to the fact that the franchise had less rolling stock than expected.

4. Delays to the electrification of the Great Western Main Line reduced the chances of cascading GWR 153 units for the Kenilworth service. In the end WMT used one of their own 153 units notwithstanding LM's preceding view that this would not be possible. Many of these complications arose from the delays in station opening date from August 2017 until after the change of franchise (October 2017).

### Further Factors

1. At the start of the project (2012/13) it was expected that Network Rail would be in overall control – 'the controlling mind' of the rail industry, potentially making processes for Third Party schemes simpler. However, this has not proved to be the case (leading to the Hendy and Hansford Reviews and the new processes of the DfT's 'Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline' [March 2018])
2. A further example of alterations to services affecting Kenilworth timetable planning was changes to Chiltern Railways' Leamington to Birmingham shuttle service in 2015 which, as with the Kenilworth service, uses Platform 4 at Leamington Spa. These required the project to undertake a further round of timetable planning and performance modelling to demonstrate the service would continue to fit with these revised operating arrangements at Leamington.
3. At one point a demountable (temporary) platform was proposed by Network Rail, since this would have avoided the need for Network Rail to slew the track over. However, it was eventually decided, after months of discussions, that the demountable platform was not needed.
4. The Common Safety Method was a further complication. Initially the scheme was to be regarded as two projects but it was then changed by Network Rail internal panel review process to one. This change, very late in the day, increased the level of safety assurance on the Network Rail infrastructure works scheme, for which due paperwork and process had to be undertaken prior to entry into service authorisation.

### Entry into Service (EIS)

1. This can be complicated as main contractors employ subcontractors and matters can slip if not properly managed. Occasionally contractors will press ahead and undertake installations relying on a perceived post installation sign-off process to validate technical questions.
2. Mechanical and Electrical Engineers (M&E) are in short supply generally, and this caused a hindrance on this scheme.

3. Network Rail did not employ specific M&E advisers on the project and focused on the platforms and other infrastructure. Nevertheless, any delays at the M&E sign off stage were very short.
4. The key with M&E is to visit the site prior to final inspection and do things on a progressive basis. For example, surge protection which was added after construction, was specified for all circuitry and telecoms, when this had not been a requirement on the detailed designs.
5. On occasions stations have been brought into service with snagging and final installations being carried out afterwards. This was not permitted and resisted to the last at Kenilworth. It reflects a lack of consistency across the industry where different promoters are involved, and indeed even on different Network Rail schemes.
6. It is important that Network Rail is satisfied with the station as it becomes their responsibility to maintain when it is signed over to them, and they are concerned that contractors and promoters will not return to fix defects in a timely way.
7. SLC believe that the EiS process needs to be more robust in its delivery and suggested that the following actions would improve / allow for the process to be completed as soon as practicable after completion of the GRIP 6 Stage.
  - The appointment of an EiS Manager who will have overall responsibility to deliver the EiS element of the works needs to be identified & resourced in the early stages of GRIP 5 to assist the Project PM
  - Resource planning templates are required to be further developed and included with milestone prompts to identify the increased workload towards EiS
  - EiS needs to be on the project agenda earlier, ideally reflecting in early GRIP Stage PMP's
  - The project Design Manager needs to be aware of all 'EiS engineering deliverables' so they are readily populated in a specific EiS project folder as they are approved through GRIP Stage 5 and 6
  - Production of an EiS Strategy reflecting stakeholders for each element of the phased programme that do not necessarily have a NR concern, an example of this could be the local highways
  - Seek to have phased hand-over for practicable completion where practicable
  - Appointment of an Engineering Safety Manager

- Have EiS included early in the stakeholder agendas so stakeholders plan and provide the resource necessary for their responsibilities
- Identify named individuals from the key stakeholders responsible for EiS interface, this should also include the Principal Contractor
- Ensure EiS robustly shown in Employer's programme so all parties are aware of the timescales and critical activities to ensure a smooth EiS
- Plan EiS to occur as defined activity within GRIP Stage 7, after successful conclusion of GRIP Stage 6 Inc. all testing, commissioning, training and certification thus project resources working on just GRIP Stage 7 deliverables
- Contractor programmes to reflect specific EiS deliverables required e.g. so delivered earlier in proceedings

### Warwickshire County Council

1. Past and present officers at the County Council have made a major contribution to the success of the Kenilworth Station project and multiple others, including Warwick Parkway, Coleshill Parkway and Stratford Parkway, Bermuda Park (and Coventry Arena). It has a track record of rail project delivery unique amongst shire councils. However, there is evidence that officers became very concerned with the political dynamic and as a result were very risk averse. Authority remained high up in the organisation and governance arrangements tended to slow down progress and dilute decision making.
2. There appeared to be an unerring faith in the power of politics. It was believed that as the Secretary of State had promised service introduction on a certain date then this would happen (It did not). The concern that this faith was unfounded extended to WCC officers and the SLC project team. On various occasions it was wrongly believed that the intervention of a senior officer would lead to progress.

### Communications

Messages regarding delays to the station opening were not handled well. It seems that even when the Council had a sense the opening would be delayed it was reluctant to release this information.

### SLC Rail's Role in Monitoring the Contractor

The SLC Rail team ensured that the Contractor was scrutinized through the following activities:

1. During the design phase, the Design Manager chaired fortnightly progress meetings with the Contractor and their designer in order to oversee the quality

of the designs being produced and to ensure that the contractor was following the NR design approval process.

2. When designs were submitted, SLC Rail carried out a review of the designs alongside the Network Rail review and provided formal comments for each discipline (Civil, Mechanical and Electrical)
3. The Contractor was required to produce a formal progress report monthly to update the Employer on all aspects of the project. The reports were presented to both SLC Rail, WCC, NR and London Midland (LM) in a monthly progress meeting.
4. The Contractor was required to submit programmes for acceptance every month. The programme submissions were scrutinized by SLC Rail PM and Planner and the Contractor was asked to justify any delay presented in the programme.
5. In addition, during construction the Contractor was requested to submit weekly look-ahead programmes with further detail of the weekly activities. SLC Rail reviewed the programme as part of the SLC Rail weekly team meeting on site to monitor the Contractor's performance against the planned activities.
6. During the construction period, SLC Rail had representation on site on a daily basis. It monitored progress on site on a daily basis and checked the quality of construction against the approved design. Quality Issues were identified, logged & progressed to both WCC & NR satisfaction.
7. SLC Rail also ensured that the works were being constructed in a safe manner and in accordance with the limitations of the Asset Protection Agreement between NR and WCC.
8. Construction Phase Plans and Work Package Plans (Method Statements and RAMS) were submitted to both NR and SLC Rail for approval prior to works commencing on site. In addition, the SLC DM ensured that any temporary works designs were checked and signed off at the appropriate level (NR where appropriate).
9. Regular Risk reduction meetings were held with Contractor to review the Early Warning raised by either party under the contract. SLC Rail and the Contractor discussed appropriate mitigations for each EWN raised.
10. Regular commercial meetings were held with the contractor to review and agree payment applications, Instructions, quotations and Compensation Events. Contractual correspondence was managed by the SLC Rail PM and commercial manager using an online tool provided by the Contractor (Viewpoint). Programme submissions were also submitted via Viewpoint.

## Learning Lessons

1. At the conclusion of all projects undertaken by SLC Rail they undertake a “Lessons Learnt” where all aspects of the project are dissected and reported upon. They consider this as a good working practice and an innovative approach that is captured and shared to promote repeat application of good practice or to avoid a negative recurrence.
2. Well-documented lessons learned enable them to further mature their project management capability and ability to deliver projects that leverage repeatable processes.
3. Both advantageous and adverse consequences within any of their projects can result in lessons learned and those that are particularly positive have been communicated outside of the team and promoted as a best practice to the rail industry.
4. The lessons learnt include the major stakeholders involved in the project, from the Client, NR, Designer’s & Principal Contractor. All views are considered and nothing is brushed under the carpet.
5. This is achieved by setting specific questions about the project, i.e. What went well, what didn’t, in each of the major deliverables, including engineering quality, programme & commercial management to name a few.
6. SLC Rail believe that by undertaking a lesson learnt then it becomes part of SLC Rail’s management process to provide future project teams with valuable insight into previous projects that are similar in nature about what went well and what did not go so well or had unintended consequences.
7. Any lessons learned captured at the end of one project are reviewed at the initiation of SLC Rail’s next project as it provides an invaluable insight to their project managers and team members of the new project to ensure that the best possible outcome is pursued.
8. SLC Rail also consider the purpose of the exercise is to recognise and document those insights so that the future project efforts incorporate more of the successful things and less of the unsuccessful things encountered by our project team.
9. Additionally, lessons learned exercises give attendees a chance to reflect on events and activities during the project and helps bring closure to the project.
10. It also provides attendees a safe and open opportunity for team members, sponsors, and stakeholders to have conversations about:
  - Successes that happened during or because of the project
  - Unintended outcomes that happened during or because of the project

- Other things that, in retrospect, might have been better handled if done differently
  - Recommendations to others who might be involved in future projects of a similar type
11. To help guide the discussions, there is a focus on major categories including people, process, and technology and then further definition of the lesson learned by type – whether the lesson is beneficial, detrimental, or simply a good practice.
- People – Project and organisational staffing and their appropriate training.
  - Process – Defined processes, procedures, standards, methodologies, templates, and guidelines that have been utilised on the project.
  - Tools/Technology – Statistical analysis and / or reporting tools, for example the use of Primavera P6.
12. SLC Rail also consider the impact/outcome of the lesson and how future projects may be affected:
- Beneficial – Where actual project event with advantageous outcome.
  - Detrimental – Lesson learned from an actual project event with adverse consequences.
  - Good Practice – Practice promoting or resulting in a positive outcome.
13. By fully capturing the essence of the discussion points identified above SLC Rail are able to collate and issue a draft Lessons Learnt for review and supplementary information to be added or statements to be amended before we officially issue the report for dissemination across the wider teams.

## 2.9.2 Evidence Provided by Network Rail

Contributing Officer:

Simon Clifford - Sponsor

### General Comments

1. The new infrastructure changes (track and signalling alterations) provide NR with more operational flexibility along this corridor that provided a wider benefit.
2. There are many complex and detailed processes required to successfully deliver railway projects, processes such as Common Safety Method (CSM) Construction Design and Management (CDM) which become particularly challenging when there are numerous projects delivering a unified output. For



Kenilworth there were numerous challenges with the CSM process which related specifically to the integration of the two projects, detailed plans were put in place to manage this however there were still some areas where a more detailed and robust plan would have helped with CSM approval. NR, SLC and WCC worked closely together to resolve issues that appeared late in the project delivery, all party's ability to work together and respond quickly to the issues raised was a positive point that should be utilised on future projects.

### Common Safety Methodology

1. The Interventions project did not require CSM approval however the CSM panel wanted to understand that the interface has been managed effectively which led to further risk information being requested by the station project. None of that should have been outside of what the process requires, however there was a lack of understanding of the CSM process that ultimately led to a delay.
2. A lesson to be learned would be to provide suitable training to all parties involved in delivering the project so they fully understand and appreciate their responsibilities under CSM when delivering infrastructure projects.
3. A key question that needs to be reviewed in more detail relates to why these projects were not delivered together as one large project. This would have been the ideal scenario. One delivery organization for both parts of the project would have been able to manage the interface and risk more effectively and led to a more efficient delivery.

### Entry into Service

1. The delay in EIS was due to the installation on site not aligning with the approved design. There were numerous areas that differed from the approved design with some elements such as the CIS screen locations within the building not having a full design at all. There were missing documents such as the telecoms technical specification that should have been completed before the works commenced on site that were still not completed when the station entered service.
2. If design and installation is performed correctly then delays can be avoided.
3. Authorisation and EIS should be fairly simple process. All that is needed is the right information being provided in a timely manner.
4. NR especially the Sponsor team worked very closely with WCC to achieve successful EIS for the building. The approach was collaborative and a positive point to take onto future projects.

### Governance

NR were not included as a key partner within the Kenilworth programme steering groups and board meetings held by WCC. This is a mistake as it created two teams that were then not working together in a true collaboration.

NR cannot be expected to collaborate if they are not being involved in the key decision-making for the projects and ultimately collaborated with by other parties.

### Network Rail as Sponsor

1. The NR Sponsor works for the Client side of the organization and holds NRIP to account (where they are the delivery arm) but cannot hold third party deliverers to account. For Kenilworth the Sponsor team worked closely with WCC, SLC Rail and NRIP to deliver the works effectively, and whilst there were delays this cannot be attributed wholesale to NR.
2. The NR Sponsor team will continue to be encouraged on future projects to work closely with third parties from an early stage to help advise and support project delivery.

### Crew Training

1. The split of the project meant that at times there was a lack of clarity over who was doing what. The division of responsibilities should have been made clearer earlier on in the project.
2. At one point it was thought that NR would be providing the crew training. However, this was not the case.
3. For the crew training material West Midlands Trains (WMT) want this 20 weeks in advance. In practice not all of the material needs to be available early on. Some of it such as the DVD can only be produced once the infrastructure works are complete.

### Funding

1. Funders sometimes have unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in a given time.
2. It is important to liaise with funders both during the bidding process and the project build to ensure that they are familiar with all the issues to be addressed.

### Data Room

1. Information was missing from the Data Room. This impacted on progress with the project.
2. The rail network is approaching capacity in some areas. The long distance nature of cross country routes means that they can be susceptible to delay. A twin track would have been a bonus but even allowing for the risks provided by

any late running by Cross Country there have been very few delays to services so far.

3. There is a risk that some partners are unreasonably blamed for delays. At times NR felt like that although it was often NR that kept matters moving.

### The Hendy Review

This led to delays but NR was able to provide evidence that it would be possible to operate an intensified service along the route as single track.

### 2.9.3 Evidence Provided by West Midlands Trains

Contributing Officer:

Steve Smith – Stations Portfolio Holder West Midlands Trains

### General Comments

1. As part of or after the review into Kenilworth Station there may be merit in bringing partners together to reflect on lessons learned.
2. Although each new station build project is unique there are always common themes to be taken account of. These involve passengers and trains and the need to bring them together.
3. Regarding the delayed opening of Kenilworth Station London Midland Trains (LMT) and later WMT did advise early on that the proposed opening dates were overly ambitious. It was recognised that there may be issues not only with the station construction but also with Entry into Service. Before the service could commence it would be necessary to put in place the station, the service arrangements, the rolling stock and the infrastructure. It would have been naïve to think that this could be done quickly.
4. West Midlands Trains (WMT) is committed to the opening of seven new stations in its franchise area over the next two to three years. This is an ambitious target. The decision on where new stations should be opened is based on a detailed business case. For example, a new station is proposed for Kings Heath. This lies firmly in the commuter belt so the business case is strong. However, a new station and infrastructure will be required as will a minimum of 2 trains an hour (probably even 3 or 4).
5. Funding for the new stations will come via the DfT as part of the franchise arrangement.

6. Providing a new Kenilworth service was not part of the franchise bid and therefore it was not part of a business case. WMT had been led to believe that the new service was up and running when it submitted its bid.
7. WMT could have walked away from the project but elected not to.
8. On reflection it would have been better if WMT had worked more directly with the County Council rather than via SLC Rail. (This is no criticism of SLC Rail but going through a third party can lead to delays). The Kenilworth Station project has resulted in closer working between WMT and partners.

### The Hendy Review

The Hendy review and the decision not to twin the Leamington to Coventry line was a disappointment. If WMT had a choice, it would have waited until such time as twin tracks were provided before agreeing to provide the service.

### Risk

1. The Kenilworth Station service adds an element of risk in terms of the overall network. This is caused in part by the need to place the train in sidings and cross lines at both Coventry and Leamington between each run. The DfT monitors the franchise performance across its entirety. If performance is poor on the Kenilworth service, then this impacts on that overall franchise performance.
2. Since the service was introduced in April 2018 there have been a handful of delays. It should be noted that if a Cross Country train is delayed then the Kenilworth train is required to wait until it has gone through.

### Crew Training

1. One complication for WMT caused by the delay in opening was that crews having been trained over a 15 month period found themselves with no service to operate. At one point, with the opening of Kenilworth Station delayed WMT did consider the introduction of services between Leamington and Coventry missing out Kenilworth until such time as it was ready.
2. A further complication arose when crew training material expected from Network Rail was not available when it was required. (Network Rail procures the training material which is shared with the rail operator before being finalised). The training material included written documentation and a DVD. (The delays in installing the infrastructure meant that the DVD could not be produced).

3. The competency of train crews needs to be maintained. The new service required six drivers and six conductors (working out of the Coventry depot). These all had to be trained. However, delays in the introduction of the service meant that a certain amount of refresher training was required. Training was undertaken in partnership with Cross-Country with crews riding on their trains for route-learning purposes.

## Rolling Stock

1. An issue encountered by LMT's Mobilisation Team was that information in the "Data Room" suggested that services had commenced in August 2017. That was what LMT and (later) WMT were working to. At the time it bid for the franchise WMT was under the impression that the service was operational. Sourcing a diesel unit proved to be a problem. In 2014 it was agreed that LMT would not run the trains. Initially it was expected that a 153 unit would be cascaded down from a route that had recently been electrified. However, a halt to electrification meant that the units did not become available.
2. Fleet provision is complex. It is important to have sufficient units to provide services. This meant having a certain number of units out in service whilst others are in for repair and service. WMT had eight 153s with six or seven of these operating at any one time.
3. WMT would have liked to have delayed the introduction of the service until it had secured a more appropriate unit. However, it bowed to pressure to open the station ASAP.
4. When Jeremy Wright MP and Chris Grayling the Secretary of State for Transport agreed an opening date of December 10 2017 they believed that WMT would be providing the stock (153 unit). Only towards the end of the process was WMT told that it would have to secure the rolling stock. Following a review of stock availability, it was concluded that a unit could only be secured to the detriment of other services. It was necessary to re-roster existing stock and reduce the number of units that could be out of service at any one time. Risks were increased further as 153 units do not perform well when there are leaves or ice or snow on the line. They are not fitted with the latest traction control technology and can experience wheel-flats as the result of sliding.
5. A major frustration of LMT and later WMT was that they had asked early on whether they needed to source a unit. They were advised at the time that there was no point in signing a leasing agreement as there was uncertainty regarding whether a unit could be sourced. When thoughts turned again to the signing of

a lease WMT was into the final 12 months of its franchise and was therefore not allowed to sign any new contracts.

6. WMT is now running all eight of its 153 units at any one time. This carries a major risk and services have been affected by non-availability. It is not appreciated that additional miles travelled add to wear and tear or that the train operators pay the train leasing companies for the miles travelled.
7. WMT has been placed in a difficult position not of its making. DfT have been made aware of this.

## 2.9.4 Evidence Provided by the Department of Transport

Contributing Officer:

John Macquarrie - Senior Commercial Manager

### Hendy Review

1. It is important to understand how decisions were made as part of the Hendy Review. The principal driver was the need to reduce rail infrastructure overspend. The Review sought to establish what could be delivered for the money available. In order to do this, it singled out projects that appeared weaker than others.
2. No one affected by the proposals contained in the Hendy Review were consulted or informed. This was a consequence of the short time frame available to complete it. It would have been preferable had the government produced a series of proposals based on the Review's findings and then consulted on them. By doing this at least people would have known what was to happen.
3. Any challenge to the outcome of the Review would have been unlikely to succeed as it remained necessary to reduce costs.
4. For the line from Leamington to Kenilworth the Review could have proposed a delay to the twinning of the track. However, the scheme was simply dropped.
5. The Kenilworth Station project then had to react to the Hendy Review.

## Progress and Delays

1. The project progressed at a reasonable pace until its final stages. Some rail partners failed to appreciate the importance of the station scheme to Warwickshire. If they had there might have been a greater sense of urgency.
2. The project led to significant improvements to the wider rail network.
3. Delays are always regrettable but they are soon forgotten. For Kenilworth Station too many opening dates were announced and missed. It would have been better to accept that delays do happen.
4. It would have been easy for the Department for Transport (DfT) to adhere only to the idea of supporting the London Midland Franchise. However, it considered that it was better if the DfT became involved on a wider scale.
5. If the DfT were to engage with a similar project in the future it would look to do so at an earlier stage. Responsibilities should be made clear at an early stage so that everyone involved is clear of their role.
6. Franchisees can be commercially very aggressive. (They exist to turn a profit). In its last 12 months the franchisee is required to seek the permission of the DfT to make certain changes. This changes the dynamic of relationships.
7. There is a sense that Warwickshire County Council and other partners were reluctant to acknowledge that the station opening would be delayed. If the threat of delay had been acknowledged, then it could have been managed more effectively.
8. Communications released by WCC in December 2017 appeared to be apportioning blame with partners. (WCC suggested that the station was complete and ready to accept trains when this was not the case). This was regrettable as it is important to ensure the overall project team continues to work well.

## Data Room

1. The Data Room is managed by the DfT. It produces an Infrastructure Assumptions Document which serves as a snap shot of the rail industry. When it was reviewed in 2017 it was believed that by December of that year there would be a train serving Kenilworth Station. It was that assumption that guided West Midlands Trains in its bid.
2. The Franchise Competitions Team oversees the Data Room.

3. On reflection it might be better that, even allowing for the snap shot approach, certain assumptions are reviewed and fed onwards to bidders so that they are clear what they are bidding on.

## Franchising

1. In the final year of an operator's franchise it is the continuing role of the DfT to oversee performance. Issues arise when a local authority that is sponsoring a new station project begins to negotiate with an outgoing operator. A possible solution is for franchise periods to transition to some extent. In the case of Kenilworth Station London Midland Trains could have been required to provide driver training after the end of the franchise. If they failed to do so then the DfT could have charged a penalty.
2. It would have been useful if the County Council had met with the DfT franchising team early on in the Kenilworth Station process. This requires a mutual understanding on behalf of the DfT and WCC.
3. WCC should also have spoken to the two bidders so that they were clear what the Council was seeking to achieve. This could have been initiated via the DfT.
4. On occasions franchises will raise objection to service proposals for no apparent reason. In these instances the issue needs to be explored. When it is any objections can usually be overcome.
5. A half hourly service is proportionately more commercially attractive than an hourly service as it encourages more people to travel by rail.
6. In Germany and the Netherlands operators serve different routes on a hub and spoke basis. This avoids line sharing by different types of service (Intercity, fast and regional).

## Working Together

1. The rail industry is very fragmented but seeks to work together as much as possible. An advantage of fragmentation is that it is possible to relatively easily identify those within various parts of the organisation that can assist.
2. It is essential that from the start senior officer buy-in is achieved. Even with Government Ministers (who change regularly) it is easier to seek their assistance if they are familiar with the details of a project. It is better to start at the highest level and then cascade responsibility downwards to an operational level. If matters do need to be escalated upwards this is made easier.



3. In the case of Warwickshire for Rugby Parkway the Chief Executive of the County Council should be engaged in high level meetings early on to develop a strategic overview. This should be regarded as the “foundation meeting”.
4. It is not possible to seek to make comparisons with station projects elsewhere as the circumstances for Kenilworth were unusual.
5. It is important to understand the position of other service providers such as Cross Country. Their business decisions are, like all other train operators, based on commercial considerations. If they were to seek to change the franchise specification they would be required to pay a charge.
6. It is important to ensure that an operator like Cross Country are party to proposals. Often a scheme will be proposed, find a sponsor, secure funding and then be considered “a done deal”. It is at this time when rail operators tend to hear about them.
7. If local authorities are seen as easy to work with it is probable that any projects in their area will be regarded favourably. This is no guarantee of support though.

### Freight Operators

1. Freight operators are important but can often be forgotten when considering station projects.
2. They have less engagement with the DfT as they do not operate franchises.

### Funding

1. If funders are seeking to impose unreasonable timescales then the challenges to be faced in the provision of a new station and service should be made very clear. To assist in this understanding funders should be encouraged to speak to the DfT and other partners.
2. There is little point in attempting to identify and adhere to “heroic” timescales that are imposed by funding.

### Rolling Stock

1. The demand for diesel units currently far exceeds availability.
2. Manufacturers are moving away from diesel construction and have little appetite for small contracts.

3. Delays in electrification on other routes have reduced through cascading of diesels into the market.
4. Looking to the future it is calculated that Rugby Parkway will require one additional electric unit.

### Political Intervention

1. With capital projects such as Kenilworth Station it can be useful at times if the local MP intervene where delays are encountered. This is what local people have a right to expect from their representative.
2. It is important that they are familiar with the detail of the project.
3. Intervention by an MP will only be helpful. It will not slow down progress.
4. Generally speaking the aim of engaging the local MP is not to secure additional funding (which it is unlikely they would succeed with) but rather to combat any delays.
5. Whilst it may not be appropriate for the local MP to sit on the project convening group it is important that they are closely involved from the start.

### Final Comments

1. The County Council must not expect to shift total responsibility for a rail project to its rail advisor. If that happens the advisor becomes seen as the client.
2. It is essential from the start to establish good communications between the project sponsor (WCC) and the DfT as the enabler.

### 3. Observations and Conclusions

This section draws on the evidence provided to the TFG. Having listened to and considered that the Group has been left with a sense of where good practice should be built on and where changes to processes should be made. Rather than attempt to build these observations into each of the preceding evidence sections it is considered best for the reader to develop a picture of the whole project so they may in turn understand its complexity and how these observations relate to each other.

#### A. General Observations and Conclusions

The TFG would wish to make the following general observations.

1. That the new Kenilworth Station was built and is now operational is a credit to campaigners from Kenilworth who worked to see this succeed, to Warwickshire County Council which drove the project forward and to partners in other local authorities and in the rail industry who helped to realise it.
2. The project saw a series of circumstances beyond the control of any one organisation came together to complicate matters and cause delays.
3. To many people the project appeared relatively simple. It was in fact very complex involving the introduction of an entirely new rail service for the West Midlands as well as significant infrastructure enhancements that have brought wider national benefits. That major challenges were successfully met is a credit to all involved.
4. All of the partners engaged in the Kenilworth Station project have considerable experience in the delivery of major transport projects. It is clear that they have used this experience to develop their processes and systems. Much good practice was brought to bear and lessons can be learned from this regarding its future use and development.
5. There are several elements of the Kenilworth Station project that could have been executed more effectively. The officers from Warwickshire County Council and partner organisations that the TFG have spoken to have been very keen to share their experiences and indicated a desire to learn from the exercise.
6. At a time when a number of local authorities appear to be avoiding becoming involved in rail enhancement projects because they are considered to be too difficult it is reassuring to see Warwickshire County Council affirm its commitment to new station construction.
7. No project is perfect and there are always lessons to be learned. It is hoped that the outcome from this review will be noted by all involved and that it will result in enhancements in working practices locally and nationally in the future.

## B. The Hendy Review

The TFG has been interested to learn of the impact of the Hendy Review both on the rate of progress of the Kenilworth Station project and what has been delivered to date. Not only did the Hendy Review remove the possibility of twinning the track between Leamington and Coventry (a move which would have seen a solution to a major bottleneck on the national network) it also put an end to plans for electrification. As a result of the Hendy Review the Kenilworth Station project experienced a significant delay and the need to amend the details of the scheme added to its cost and complexity.

The Group has received evidence that the Hendy Review took little account of the impact of its proposals on existing and proposed schemes. This is regrettable.

The Group considers that Warwickshire County Council should write to the Secretary of State for Transport to express its concerns over the impact of the Hendy Review on the Kenilworth Station project and seek assurance that the current Williams Review will take greater account of the needs of others.

## C. Governance and Accountability

The TFG has welcomed that Warwickshire County Council has in place clear governance arrangements for major capital schemes. It is also pleased to note that this system has been developed using lessons learned from previous schemes such as the Rugby Western Relief Road.

That individual officers and elected members are cited on the supporting material for governance arrangements is of benefit as it is expected that each will understand what is expected of them.

The TFG is clear on the stated remit of the Major Schemes Board and understands why it was established. However, the group has also developed a sense that only having a very high level oversight of projects could limit the Board's understanding of a project's complexity and in turn its capacity to offer assistance where necessary.

The existence of a communications sub-group under the governance structure is welcomed. However, as is noted elsewhere in this report, the attendance at meetings of that sub-group was variable throughout the life of the project. This is regrettable. Continued collaboration on communications may have assisted in the ability to convey a joint message regarding the challenges being addressed ahead of the delay in opening.

The group recognises that working relationships between all parties can be enhanced if at the commencement of a project a meeting is convened of senior officers from the partner agencies. This enables a degree of mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities and encourages a spirit of professional familiarity that promotes good communication and problem solving where difficulties are encountered. It would be of benefit if this arrangement was placed on a formal footing with terms of reference. This would reduce the chances of people not understanding what is expected of them.

The successful delivery of the new station in Kenilworth is evidence of the general effectiveness of the governance arrangements that were in place. Nevertheless, there is a sense that there may be times when the Major Schemes Board will need to involve itself at a more operational level especially when the capacity to apply leverage held by its members is required to be deployed. The Group notes that the Major Schemes Board has operated for some time but considers that its terms of reference might benefit from a review to reflect changing operating practices. This review should be undertaken by the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee.

It had been suggested at one point that a template for the management of major transport projects could be developed and used. However, acknowledging that no two projects are the same this was discounted. A step forward though is the current development of a project management framework which it is expected will work alongside the Council's performance management framework.

#### D. The Intervention Stage

The TFG is mindful of the challenges faced by Network Rail in maintaining the national rail network and meeting the expectations of so many organisations.

The TFG initially developed a sense that in terms of the strategic rail network the Kenilworth Station project might at times have seemed a minor side-issue to some partners. This was clearly not the view of Warwickshire County Council, its local partners and the people of Warwickshire and for this reason it was important to ensure that the County Council and Network Rail worked effectively together. Evidence received from Network Rail is that the Kenilworth Station project was, despite being relatively small, given as much attention and priority as other projects in the West Midlands. In addition, the TFG has learned that in order to attempt to adhere to timescales Network Rail books more track possessions than it may require. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that whilst Network Rail delivered in terms of infrastructure the nature of its work and the competing priorities it faces mean that on occasions it was not able to provide the support needed when it was needed. The County Council found itself powerless in these circumstances but at the same time recognises the task that Network Rail has on its hands. It is not easy to offer a solution to the dilemma of having plant and staff on site just when they are needed. There appear to be few if any incentives to Network Rail to ensure that it is able to meet its deadlines. If there are incentives, they are not readily apparent.

The TFG is of the view that whilst the key to effective joint working lies in communication and a mutual understanding of the challenges to be addressed there is also a need to consider whether steps should be put in place arrangements in which rail industry partners enter into binding commercial agreements to deliver their agreed outputs.

#### E. Change in Franchise/ Data Room/Crew Training

That a change in franchise occurred towards the end of the Kenilworth Station project added significant complications. The TFG has learned of issues with the information provided to franchise bidders by the Data Room, the limitations placed on London

Midland Trains in its final year of the franchise and the challenges faced by West Midlands Trains when it commenced the franchise and realised that the Kenilworth Station project was unable to be as advanced as they first thought, that train units had to be sourced and crews trained.

It has been suggested that a possible means of avoiding a repeat of some of these issues is to introduce a period of transition for franchises. This would ensure that the outgoing rail operator remained responsible for certain aspects of their work beyond the end of the franchise. The TFG considers that Warwickshire County Council should write to the Secretary of State for Transport suggesting this.

The issues with the Data Room do require attention. That a franchise bidder based their assumptions on a snapshot that was out of date as soon as it was created is a concern. This is not a matter that Warwickshire County Council or Kenilworth Town Council can address directly but it is felt that the lessons learned through this review should be relayed to the DfT.

## F. Rolling Stock/Units

The TFG acknowledge the challenges faced daily by a train operating company such as West Midlands Trains. In the instance of Kenilworth Station, the change of franchisee only a few weeks before the Kenilworth service was due to be introduced led to further complications for the company. It is suggested that the problems faced by West Midlands Trains in obtaining rolling stock and staff at relatively short notice reflect more the national picture of the pared down condition of the rail network.

That West Midlands Trains was prepared to take risks by utilising one of its current units is to be commended especially given the emphasis placed on service reliability by those monitoring franchise performance.

It is expected that this report will be circulated within the rail industry and that those in authority will recognise that having no give in the system can add to delays to the introduction of services.

General difficulties in securing rolling stock are recognised. Efforts and negotiations to do so began in 2013, as part of the New Stations Fund submission, and involved direct discussions with the DfT, the Rolling Stock Leasing companies and individual Train Operating Companies who operated Class 153 units (e.g. GWR, Northern etc). This is not a matter that the TFG can resolve. Nevertheless, it is considered that government should be reminded of the knock-on effect that delays in infrastructure improvements eg electrification can have on other aspects of rail operation.

## G. Entry into Service

Towards the end of the project, when public anticipation of the opening of the station was at its peak it is regrettable that there were a series of delays.

The Group has learned about the complications presented around M&E installation and sign-off and understands the challenges currently faced by the rail industry in this area.

The TFG is of the view that M&E planning and delivery should have been commenced earlier with contractors, sub-contractors and those responsible for sign off working more closely together. SLC Rail has proposed a series of improvements to the EIS stage. Whilst these may not be applicable in all cases the Group considers that they should be adopted by the County Council and disseminated more widely.

## H. Communications

Communication around the Kenilworth Station project took two different forms. Communication between those charged with completing the project and communication with the wider public.

There is evidence that communication between partners could at times have been better. The Group has heard evidence that at times some partners felt excluded from the table. This may be down to individuals' perceptions or the result of a more deliberate decision. Whatever the cause, it is important that all parties are clear on their roles, that they are valued and that when appropriate their contributions will be sought. If partners are not engaged for a particular reason they need to understand why.

It is suggested that the key to success is the establishment of good working relationships from the start and clear communications. There is no doubt that time invested early on in a project in developing those relationships will pay dividends later on when a quick face to face meeting or phone call can get matters back on track very quickly. This is referenced earlier in this section when discussing governance.

It is clear that communication with the wider public around opening dates was well intentioned being based on the information available at the time. Nevertheless, there are clearly lessons to be learned for the future. The TFG considers that it is better to maintain a general approach to announcing opening dates rather than citing one particular day. Given the challenges that needed to be overcome at Kenilworth it was, in hindsight, ill advised to announce any particular day for the introduction of services. It is acknowledged that at some point it is necessary to announce an opening date but if circumstances result in services running prior to that date few if any people would complain. Late opening, is however, almost always guaranteed to attract criticism. Evidence suggests that had communications regarding progress been issued by all partners the likelihood of Warwickshire County Council being regarded in a negative way would have been reduced. The Group considers that recommendations are required both for the careful identification of opening dates and the need for joint communication.

## I. Economic and Social Impact of Delays to the Opening and Reputational Damage –

The TFG has considered the issue of reputational damage. Certainly during the period between the completion of the station building and the introduction of services there was degree of frustration expressed by some members of the community.

In the light of the responses received to the survey questionnaire it is clear that the impact of delays to individuals has been minimal. The public questionnaire did not ask for views on how satisfied people are with the station now that it is open but with ever

increasing patronage there is a sense that any damage that may have occurred in April 2018 was short lived.

## J. Learning Lessons

The TFG recognises the views of officers and specialist advisers. It is essential that all parties learn from their experiences over time. The key is to maintain this on a formal and measured footing. A logical and thorough means of recording experience and then revisiting it at the commencement of new projects is necessary.

To assist in this the TFG considers that the County Council should commit to the establishment and maintenance of a body of lessons learned evidence from infrastructure projects. This need not be an expensive exercise but it does need to be placed on a formal basis with an officer or officers charged with ensuring it is kept up to date and circulated effectively.

In order to ensure that the lessons from any project are harvested effectively the group would strongly recommend that as soon as any project is complete the key partners meet and reflect on their role in it seeking to identify elements that can be improved on. Representatives from partner agencies have agreed that this is advisable. At the time of writing this report all partners have agreed to attend a meeting, however due to full completion and sign-off not having occurred, a meeting is still to be arranged.

## K. Political Intervention

The Group has learned that on occasions throughout this project it has been necessary to seek leverage from very senior individuals such as the local MP or Councillors to progress the project. There is no evidence that Kenilworth is unique in this respect. Indeed, there is a sense that national and local politicians exist to represent the interests of their constituents and should be seeking to progress major projects. It is often the case that a word with the right person can help to “oil the wheels”.

## L Specific Observations Concerning Warwickshire County Council

It would be wrong if a review of the Kenilworth Station project commissioned by Warwickshire County Council did not reflect on the role of the authority in its completion. Only by doing this can lessons be learned for the future.

What went well from a County Council Perspective?

1. Building on its record of new station projects, the County Council demonstrated foresight in pursuing the Kenilworth Station project. The opening of a new station in a town required a series of challenges around land acquisition, the securing of funding and planning permissions. To secure a brand new service required investment in good partnership working with a range of rail agencies. Being a third party agency added a further dimension to the project.
2. The County Council demonstrated that it had learned from past projects and that it adheres to good practice in terms of project management.



3. The governance arrangements (major boards and sub groups) are effective and were well supported by officers. The operational level meetings with partners to oversee the day to day delivery of the project were effective. (But see below).
4. The governance arrangement in relation to the commercial/contract management was very effective, incorporating lesson learned from previous projects.
5. That the station has come in on budget reflects well on the project's financial /contract management.
6. The County Council clearly worked well with its specialist rail adviser and recognised the benefits its rail adviser brings to the project.
7. The consultation and engagement with the public played a key role in the design choice and provided links to the original station.
8. Local County Councillors played a key role in gathering support for the project.
9. The project engaged with the community and residents in relation to the development especially given the challenge of being a town centre location. Consideration was also given to the audiences involved and the communication channels used.

#### What went less well from a County Council Perspective?

1. Although it had and generally adhered to a communications strategy, communication of progress and opening dates should have been managed more effectively. It would have been better if the County Council had:
  - a) been much clearer in explaining the complexity of the project and the nature of the service to be provided.
  - b) emphasised that most elements of the project were reliant on partner agencies delivering on time.
  - c) been less prepared to broadcast specific forecast opening dates. On reflection a more general opening date should have been announced.
2. There is evidence that whilst lessons are learned from past projects an enthusiasm to engage with the next scheme meant that no formal approach was adopted to revisit the lessons of the past.
3. Recognising the current terms of reference of the Major Schemes Board it appears that greater clarity needs to be given to its governance role on major infrastructure schemes. This is not a criticism of the individuals involved but more an observation on the role of the Board.
4. The Council should have recognised the value of convening a meeting of senior officers from all agencies at an early stage of the project. By building relationships at a high level open and frank conversations could have been held where problems were encountered.



*The First Train 30 April 2019*

## 4. Recommendations

### Future Rail Reviews

1. That the Leader of Warwickshire County Council should write to the Secretary of State for Transport requesting that future reviews take greater account of the needs of local authorities and partners in rail enhancement projects. This should particularly draw attention to the financial and social impact that changes in policy can have on on-going projects.

### Learning Lessons

2. That the current practice of holding a “Lessons Learned” session on the completion of every major transport project, where considered appropriate involving all partners (including relevant elected representatives) be continued and that messages resulting from that session be published and circulated widely.
3. That given its track record of successful delivery of new stations Warwickshire County Council commits to the ongoing maintenance of a body of evidence regarding past major transport projects and lessons learned from them.
4. That at the inception of any major transport projects the Project Manager convenes a short life working group comprising council officers and members and other partners to review lessons learned from previous projects undertaken in Warwickshire and elsewhere

### Governance

5. That, as is already the practice, at the commencement of a major transport scheme (once partners have been appointed/ identified) a meeting be convened by officers of Warwickshire County of senior representatives from those agencies involved to develop a mutual understanding of the project’s objectives and of roles and responsibilities. The meeting should be accompanied and guided by clear terms of reference placing it on a formal footing.
6. That the terms of the reference for the Major Schemes Board be reviewed by the Communities Overview and Scrutiny Committee with consideration being given to how it can offer support to others in the governance structure when greater authority is required to be used.

### The Intervention Stage

7. That, recognising limitations on resources, the Leader of the Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport with a request that consideration be given to ways in which rail industry partners enter into binding commercial agreements to deliver their agreed outputs.

## Funding

8. That the Leader of the Council be asked to liaise with the Coventry and Warwickshire Local Enterprise Partnership (and other funding providers) to explain the negative effect that the application of very tight and rigid funding timescales can have on effective project management.
9. That during negotiations regarding funding partners who will be involved in project delivery be invited to liaise with fund holders to establish a common understanding of the challenges around timescales.

## Communication

10. That from the commencement of a major transport project its nature and complexity and the reliance by partners on each other should be made explicit in all internal and external communications.
11. From the outset communications should be clear regarding the extent of the scheme, the services it will offer and the benefits it will bring. These messages should be repeated throughout the life of the project build.
12. That so far as is practicable all communications to the media and to communities be produced and broadcast collectively by all partners.
13. That whilst being honest and transparent completion dates for major transport schemes should be indicative only – as with the delivery of Highway Projects. This should be made clear in all communications.

## Entry into Service

14. That consideration be given to the adoption of the improvements to the entry into service process as suggested by SLC Rail. These are:
  - The appointment of an EiS Manager who will have overall responsibility to deliver the EiS element of the works needs to be identified & resourced in the early stages of GRIP 5 to assist the Project PM.
  - Resource planning templates to be further developed and included with milestone prompts to identify the increased workload towards EiS
  - EiS needs to be on the project agenda earlier, ideally reflecting in early GRIP Stage PMP's
  - The project Design Manager needs to be aware of all 'EiS engineering deliverables' so they are readily populated in a specific EiS project folder as they are approved through GRIP Stage 5 and 6
  - Production of an EiS Strategy reflecting stakeholders for each element of the phased programme that do not necessarily have a NR concern, an example of this could be the local highways

- Seek to have phased hand-over for practicable completion where practicable
- Appointment of an Engineering Safety Manager
- Have EiS included early in to the stakeholder agenda's so stakeholders plan and provide the resource necessary for their responsibilities
- Identify named individuals from the key stakeholders responsible for EiS interface, this should also include the Principal Contractor
- Ensure EiS robustly shown in Employers programme so all parties are aware of the timescales and critical activities to ensure a smooth EiS
- Plan EiS to occur as defined activity within GRIP Stage 7, after successful conclusion of GRIP Stage 6 Inc. all testing, commissioning, training and certification thus project resources working on just GRIP Stage 7 deliverables
- Contractor programmes to reflect specific EiS deliverables required e.g. so delivered earlier in proceedings

### Data Room

15. That the Leader of Warwickshire County Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport highlighting the difficulties the “snap shot” approach currently used by the Data Room can present to franchise bidders and the issues it presented to the current train operator in terms of its preparedness to operate trains to Kenilworth.

### Political Intervention

16. That as is current practice, from the early stages of a major transport project local MPs and Councillors be fully briefed by partners on its detail, both in terms of business case and potential challenges.

### Changes in Franchise

17. That in order to reduce disruption to evolving rail projects the Leader of the Council writes to the Secretary of State for Transport asking that consideration be given to the introduction of a period of transition when rail franchises change.



## Appendices

- A TFG Terms of Reference
- B Projects Supported by the New Stations Fund
- C Project Timeline
- D Full results of public survey
- E Glossary

## Terms of Reference

<b>Review Topic</b>	<b>Kenilworth Railway Station Review</b>
<b>Task and Finish Group Members</b>	<p>John Bridgeman CBE – Chair</p> <p>Warwickshire County Council - Councillors Richard Chattaway (L), Alan Cockburn (C), Bill Gifford (LD), Wallace Redford (C), and Adrian Warwick (C)</p> <p>Kenilworth Town Council - Councillor Michael Coker</p>
<b>Key Departments</b>	Communities Directorate – Transport and Economy
<b>Support Officers</b>	<p>Paul Williams – Democratic Services Team Leader</p> <p>Ian Marriott – Corporate Legal Service Manager</p> <p>Margaret Smith – Senior Transport Planner</p> <p>Industry Expert (external)</p>
<b>Timescales/ completion</b>	Anticipated timescale of circa 3 months – with the aim of reporting to autumn cycle of committee meetings as appropriate.
<b>Rationale</b> (Key issues and/or reason for doing the review)	<p>Kenilworth Station opened to the public on 30<sup>th</sup> April 2018. The original anticipated opening date following confirmation of funding was December 2016. There were a series of revisions to the opening date for a variety of reasons. The delivery of this project generated local interest from members of the public and the media. Concern has also been raised by elected members about the revisions to the opening of the station to the public. This issue was raised at full Council on 20 March 2018 when the Leader confirmed that a Task and Finish Group would be established to look into the issues which have impacted on the timescale for the opening of the station.</p> <p>The remit of this Task and Finish Group is therefore to explore what factors influenced the opening date and to identify what lessons can be learnt for future rail projects.</p> <p>The work of this review supports the following Council priority: <i>To ensure that Warwickshire's economy is vibrant and supported by the right jobs, training and skills and infrastructure.</i></p>
<b>Objectives of Review</b> (Specify exactly what the review should achieve)	The review should seek to make recommendations for consideration by the Communities OSC and then to be submitted to Cabinet as appropriate, and/or other relevant partners and decision makers, concerning the approach to developing and managing the delivery of rail projects to specified timeframes including lessons learnt and areas for improvement for future similar schemes



<p><b>Scope of the Topic</b> (What is specifically to be included/excluded)</p>	<p>The following is <u>included</u> in the scope of the review:</p> <p>The remit of this Task and Finish Group is to explore the process leading to the opening of the Kenilworth Railway Station and to identify what lessons can be learnt for future rail projects focusing on the following themes;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) Project design and sign off and reasons for/impact of subsequent changes</li> <li>(ii) Project planning and project management arrangements</li> <li>(iii) Project delivery and sign off and the foreseeability of any complications during implementation</li> <li>(iv) Partnership working arrangements, the role of different agencies and their industry processes and any associated impact on project delivery</li> <li>(v) The social and economic impacts of the revised opening date</li> </ul> <p>The following falls outside the scope of the review and will be <u>excluded</u>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Funding arrangements for the Kenilworth Railway station</li> <li>➤ Contractual and/or other agreements which remain the subject of negotiation</li> </ul>
<p><b>How will the public be involved?</b></p>	<p>The Task and Finish Group will engage with the local community primarily through the Kenilworth Town Council</p>
<p><b>Which partners could be involved?</b></p>	<p>Potential for the following groups to be consulted / give evidence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SLC Rail (WCC's rail consultants)</li> <li>• Network Rail</li> <li>• Department for Transport (rail section)</li> <li>• West Midlands trains – train operator</li> <li>• Office of Rail and Road</li> </ul>
<p><b>What primary / new evidence is needed?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Details and background of scheme</li> <li>• Project Delivery Plan</li> <li>• Project management and governance arrangements</li> <li>• Documentation supporting project sign off</li> <li>• Officer /Councillor/ Partner views on the delivery of the project</li> <li>• A list of interested parties/ partners and respective roles</li> <li>• Other to be identified during technical evidence gathering stage</li> </ul>

<p><b>What secondary / existing information will be needed?</b> (i.e. background information, existing reports, legislation, central gov reports)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Network Rail / DfT rail procedural guidance (GRIP) – extracts as relevant</li> <li>• Evidence of WCC’s experience of previous rail projects</li> <li>• Relevant reports / research / guidance on delivery of rail projects nationally – to be researched</li> <li>• Other to be identified during technical evidence gathering stage</li> </ul>
<p><b>Indicators of Success</b> (What factors would tell you what a good review should look like? What are the potential outcomes of the review e.g. service improvements, policy change, etc?)</p>	<p>The review will conclude by presenting realistic, evidenced based and well-reasoned recommendations to decision makers, together with a persuasive narrative that supports the changes proposed. Any recommendations with financial implications should identify potential funding streams accordingly.</p> <p>The review will be successful if lessons learned can be identified so that improvements can be made to the future design and delivery of rail projects.</p>

### Projects Supported by the New Stations Fund

The New Stations Fund was set up to provide £20m towards the cost of building new stations to help give communities improved access to rail services in England and Wales. The funding was distributed through a competition, giving all promoters of new stations meeting the conditions an equal opportunity of securing a funding contribution. The first competition period ran from 24 January 2013 to 25 February 2013. A cross-industry awards panel met to consider all applications received by the closing date and selected five projects:

- Pye Corner, Wales – opened 14 December 2014
- Newcourt, Exeter – opened 4 June 2015
- Lea Bridge, London – opened 16 May 2016
- Ilkeston, Derby – opened 2 April 2017
- Kenilworth, Warwickshire – opened

The following is a summary of each of the projects (other than Kenilworth).

#### a) Pye Corner, Newport, Wales



Pye Corner Station on the Ebbw Valley Line between Rogerstone and Cardiff is an element in the ongoing development of an integrated transport network plan for South East Wales. Costing £1.9 million, the new 145m single platform station includes a car park with spaces for 62 cars, cycle parking and footpath access. The station was jointly funded by the Welsh Government and the New Stations Fund.

b) Newcourt Station, Exeter



Newcourt Station was the first station to open in Devon in over 20 years. Costing £2.2m it was originally expected to cost £1.5m but unforeseen additional work such as the replacement of signalling equipment and accessibility requirements at new stations pushed up the price. In addition increased land costs and rail industry costs were reportedly under estimated. The station comprises a single platform station at Newcourt. It is aimed at mitigating the impacts of the Newcourt development at the already congested road junctions of Countess Wear and junction 30 of the M5 to the south of Exeter.

c) Lea Bridge Station, London



Lea Bridge Station, located in Leyton, East London is not a new-build. It is a re-build, opened on 16 May 2016. Lea Bridge is situated on the line between Bishops Stortford and Stratford and offers six-minute journeys to Stratford and Tottenham Hale.

The cost of the project was 11.6m. £5m was provided by Waltham Forest Council, £1.1m from the New Station Fund and £5.5m from S106 monies.

The project did not encounter any major problems possibly owing to its status as a former station with stopping rail services already running on the line.

d) Ilkeston Station Derby



The Derbyshire town of Ilkeston, population 38,640, was at one time labelled “England’s largest town on a passenger railway line without a railway station”. In 2013 Derbyshire County Council developed a business case and submitted a bid to the New Stations Fund. The bid was founded on the premise that a new station on the site of the old Ilkeston Junction station could cut commuter times into Nottingham, open up job opportunities along the line for people living in the town and help boost the town’s economy.


Site investigation was undertaken which resulted in the discovery of Great Crested Newts. There were also flooding concerns and the station had to be de-scoped to avoid work in the flood plain. Mine workings beneath the platform and bridge structures needed to be stabilised prior to their installation. Bores were drilled at three-metre centres and 24 metres deep.

Funding was sourced as follows. £2.26 million from Derbyshire County Council, £6.674 million from New Stations Fund and £1 million contributed by Nottingham Housing Market Area.

Northern Rail operate the main train service hourly between Nottingham, Sheffield and Leeds. East Midlands Trains are the station operator. The 100-metre platforms are the length of a four-car Class 158 train, or can be used by a five- car Meridian if it is stopped precisely.

160,000 passengers a year are expected to use the new station initially, rising to 250,000 over time. A commute to Nottingham takes 15-20 minutes, as opposed to 40-60 by road, with similar time-savings to Sheffield.

# Kenilworth Station – Timeline of Key Decisions and Programme Delays



### Kenilworth Station Review – feedback from public engagement

#### 1. Purpose of public engagement

- 1.1 As part of the Kenilworth Station review, the Task and Finish Group agreed to undertake engagement with the public. The purpose of the public engagement was three-fold:
- to gain information about how rail users found out about the station project, including keeping up to date with station delivery progress;
  - to establish to what extent the delayed opening of the station impacted on the public and to understand the nature of this impact;
  - to gain information around usage of the new station.


#### 2. Method of engagement

- 2.1 The method of engagement was via a questionnaire survey distributed to rail users at Kenilworth Station over the period 1 October – 19 October 2018. Copies of the questionnaire were also available at Kenilworth library. As the focus of the WCC Communications activity for Kenilworth Station focused on the town itself, it was decided not to distribute the questionnaire more widely to destinations served by the new shuttle service (Leamington Spa and Coventry rail stations).
- 2.2 Participants could return their completed questionnaires to the Community Ticket Office at Kenilworth Station or Kenilworth library. Alternatively, participants could send their questionnaires to the County Council offices in Warwick using a freepost address included within the questionnaire survey.

#### 3. Summary of Responses


- 3.1 In total, 129 completed questionnaires were received. A summary of the responses to each question is provided below.

**Q1. How did you find out about the proposal to re-open Kenilworth Station?**



The local press or radio (41%/74 responses) was the most common way of finding out about the proposal to re-open Kenilworth Station, followed by word of mouth (31%/55 responses).


**Q2a. Did you keep up to date with progress on the station's delivery?**




The majority of respondents (over 90%/117 responses) kept up to date with the station's delivery. The local press/radio was the most common way of keeping up to date (34%/83 responses), followed by word of mouth (23%/57 responses), social media (18%/45 responses) and Warwickshire County Council's website (11%/27 responses).



**Q2b. If yes, what source(s) of information did you use? (Respondents were asked to tick all that apply)**



**Q3. To what extent did the delayed station opening impact on you?**



### ***No impact / minor impact***

72% of respondents (93 responses) indicated that the delayed station opening had no impact or a minor impact on them. The description of minor impacts are summarised below:

- More convenient way to travel / couldn't use trains (9 responses);
- Increased cost of commute (7 responses);
- Deferred journeys / changed plans (7 responses);
- Continued to use bus service (5 responses);
- Continued to use other stations (3 responses);
- Had to use car (2 responses);
- Annoying / disappointed (2 responses);
- Showed up local authority (1 response);
- Not knowing reason for delay (1 response);
- Wasn't there before so limited impact (1 response);
- Risk of losing interest / support for project (1 response).

### ***Moderate impact***

Just under a quarter of respondents (23%/30 responses) stated that the delay had resulted in a moderate impact. The description of moderate impacts are summarised below:


- Increased cost of commute (11 responses);
- Unable to travel by train (5 responses);
- Continued to use bus service (5 responses);
- Deferred journeys / plans had to be changed (4 responses);
- Nuisance / frustrated by wait (3 responses);
- Had to use other stations (1 response);
- Had to drive (1 response);
- Couldn't progress in job (1 response);
- Couldn't use for school or to see friends (1 response).

### ***Severe impact***

Just under 5% of respondents (6 responses) stated the impact of the delayed station opening was severe. The description of severe impacts are listed below:


- Purchased a rail card to be used in February. Due to delay this went unused for several months. Had to use bus services to get to work which cost more money (1 response);
- Had to use car for commute (1 response);
- Missed last bus and had to get a taxi a number of times (1 response);
- Continued to use the bus service (1 response);
- Couldn't travel by train to Coventry. Had to take a 45minute bus journey (1 response);
- Now it's opened, missing connecting trains to Nuneaton and Coventry (1 response).

#### Q4. Have you used the new station?




Nearly all respondents (97%/125 responses) have used the new station. The most common journey purpose is for leisure/tourism (32%/88 responses), followed by work (26%/69 responses) and shopping (21%/55 responses).

#### Q5. For what purpose have you used Kenilworth Station? (Respondents were asked to tick all that apply)




**Q6. How did you make this journey before Kenilworth Station was re-opened?**



The majority of respondents (43%/82 responses) previously made their journey by car. A significant transfer has also been made from bus travel (28%/53 responses) and transfer from nearby rail stations (23%/43 responses). Railheads used prior to Kenilworth Station re-opening include:


- Coventry (20 responses);
- Leamington Spa (11 responses);
- Warwick Parkway (10 responses);
- Tile Hill (6 responses).

**Q7. How often do you use Kenilworth Station?**




The majority of respondents use Kenilworth Station on a frequent basis, with two thirds (86 responses) travelling 1-3 days per week or more (43% travel 1-3 days per week, 18% travel 2-4 days per week and 6% travel 5 or more times per week). A third of respondents (41 responses) use the station less than once per month.

**Q8. If starting your journey in Kenilworth, what is your usual travel method to get to Kenilworth Station?**



There is a high walk up demand for Kenilworth Station, with almost three quarters of responses stating this mode as their usual travel method to get to the station (105 responses). Access by car is listed in 13% of responses (19 responses), with bus travel making up 8% of responses (12 responses).

**Q9. Are you aware of the new bus service serving Kenilworth Station?**



The majority of respondents (83%/104 responses) are aware of the new bus service serving Kenilworth Station.

## APPENDIX E - Glossary

### **Abellio**

Abellio operates public transport services in Europe, with both bus and rail networks. It was founded as NedRailways in 2001, before being renamed Abellio in October 2009. Abellio is wholly owned by the Dutch national rail operator Nederlandse Spoorwegen. Abellio is part of a consortium with JR East and Mitsui which operate West Midlands Trains the franchisee that serves Kenilworth Station.

### **Cascade of Train Units**

Each item of rolling stock is leased by a train operating company from a train leasing company. In the UK there is very little spare capacity in terms of rolling stock availability. Where new services are to be introduced (such as with Kenilworth Station) stock has to be secured. If new stock is not required, then stock used elsewhere is cascaded down. It was expected that electrification would free up diesel stock. However, the Hendy review reduced the length of line to be electrified and so reduced the opportunities to redeploy diesel stock elsewhere.

### **CDM- Construction Design Management**

The Construction Design and Management Regulations 2015, also known as CDM Regulations or CDM 2015, which came into force on 6 April 2015, are regulations governing the way construction projects of all sizes and types are planned. CDM 2015 is the latest update to the regulations that aim to improve the overall health, safety and welfare of those working in construction. These regulations offer a very broad definition of what construction works are - everyone involved in a construction project, including home maintenance and improvement works, has responsibility for health and safety.

### **CE- Compensation Event**

Compensation events (CE) are the terminology used in NEC3 contracts to cover variations, loss and expense and extensions of time. A CE deals with the entire effect of an event on time and money. The contract will specify which events are compensation events.

### **CIS Screen- Customer Information System**

A Customer Information System (CIS) is an automated system for supplying users of public transport with information about the nature and state of a public transport service, through visual, voice or other media. They are also known as Passenger Information Systems and Operational Information Systems. Among the information provided by such systems, a distinction can be drawn between:

- **Static** or schedule information, which changes only occasionally and is typically used for journey planning prior to departure.
- **Real Time information**, derived from automatic vehicle location systems, which changes continuously as a result of real-world events and is typically used during the course of a journey (primarily how close the service is running to time and when it is due at a stop, but also incidents that affect service operations, platform changes etc.).

## **Control Period**

Network Rail Control Periods are the 5 year timescales into which Network Rail works for financial and other planning purposes. Each control Period begins on 1 April and end 31 March to coincide with the financial year.

## **Common Safety Methodology (CSM)**

The starting point for anyone proposing any change in relation the mainline railway system is the CSM. The CSM applies when any technical, operational or organisation change is being proposed to the railway system. A person making the change needs to firstly consider if a change has an impact on safety. If there is no impact on safety, the risk management process in the CSM need not be applied and the proposer must keep a record of how it arrived at its decision.

## **Data Room**

Data rooms are spaces used for housing data, usually of a secure or privileged nature. They can be physical data rooms, virtual data rooms or data centres. They are used for a variety of purposes, including data storage, document exchange, file sharing, financial transactions, legal transactions, etc. Traditional data rooms are a physically secure continually monitored room, which bidders and their advisers will visit in order to inspect and report on the various documents and other data made available.

## **DRN - Design Review Notice Period**

A Design Review Notice is a process whereby designs are submitted to Network Rail for comment and approval.

## **Entry into Service**

In order for the station and the facilities to be taken into service and used by the public, the rail industry conducts an Entry into Service approval process before an official handover can take place. On-site inspections are carried out by specialist project engineers from a range of disciplines (civils, mechanical & engineering, telecoms) to assess the new asset for safe functional operation.

## **EWN- Early Warning Notice**

An early warning notice is used during the contract period where there could be a change to the original contract specification. Contracts have a very clear, simple, but critical process for 'early warning'. The contractor and project manager are expected to notify each other of any matter which could affect the cost, completion, progress or quality of the project.

The early warning process is simple in principle and critical to the success of contracts and facilitating a **spirit of mutual trust and cooperation**.

## **GRIP Stages**

Governance for Railway Investment Projects (GRIP) is a management and control process developed by Network Rail for delivering projects on the operational railway. GRIP was developed to minimise and mitigate the risks associated with projects to enhance or renew the operational railway and projects in a high street environment. It is based on best practice within industries that undertake major infrastructure



projects and practice recommended by the bodies including the Association of Project Management (APM and the Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB)).

GRIP is product rather than process driven and divides projects into eight distinct stages:

1. Output definition.
2. Feasibility.
3. Option selection.
4. Single option development.
5. Detailed Design.
6. Construction test and commission.
7. Scheme hand back.
8. Project close out.

Formal reviews examine the project at critical stages in its lifecycle to provide assurance that it can successfully progress to the next stage.

### **Hansford Review**

Professor Peter Hansford of University College London was commissioned by the Board of Network Rail to undertake an Independent Review of 'contestability' in the UK Rail Market, with the intent of "Encouraging Third Party Investment and Infrastructure Delivery on the National Railway". The Review considered opportunities for innovation and the use of alternative project delivery models on Britain's rail network, and explore the barriers that prevent or discourage third parties from investing in, and delivering, rail infrastructure projects. The review report was published in July 2017.

### **Hendy Review/Report**

Undertaken by Sir Peter Hendy (Chairman of Network Rail) this review and resultant report focused on investment into the rail network. In reviewing projects, it was concluded that a number were running over time and over budget.

### **Interventions Work**

The Interventions Work in relation to the Kenilworth Station project relates to the trackside works required to improve the rail infrastructure to deliver the new service e.g. moving the track (track slew) and installation of the new signalling.

### **Kenilworth Loop**

A length of twin track forming a passing loop to the north of Kenilworth Station.

### **LEP- Local Enterprise Partnership**

Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) are voluntary partnerships between local authorities and businesses set up in 2011 by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to help determine local economic priorities and lead economic growth and job creation within the local area. They carry out some of the functions previously carried out by the Regional Development Agencies which were abolished in March 2012.

### **London Midland Trains**

The former operator of local services between Leamington and Coventry. In late 2017 the franchise changed to West Midlands Trains.

### **Mott MacDonald**

The Mott MacDonald Group is a consultancy with headquarters in the United Kingdom. It employs 16,000 staff in 150 countries. Mott MacDonald is one of the largest employee-owned companies in the world. It was established in 1989 by the merger of Mott, Hay and Anderson with Sir M MacDonald & Partners.

### **Network Rail**

Network Rail is the owner and infrastructure manager of most of the rail network in the UK. It is an arm's length public body of the Department of Transport with no shareholders. Network Rail was a major partner in the Kenilworth Station project.

### **Network Rail Sponsor**

The officer employed by Network Rail who provides a crucial link between agencies promoting rail projects and those in Network Rail who will undertake infrastructure work.

### **New Stations Fund**

A £20m fund towards the cost of building new stations is helping give local communities improved access to rail services in England and Wales.

The funding is distributed through a competition, giving all promoters of new stations meeting the conditions an equal opportunity of securing a funding contribution.

### **Primavera P6**

A project management tool.

### **Prince 2 (Project Management)**

PRINCE2 (PROjects IN Controlled Environments) is a structured project management method and practitioner certification programme. PRINCE2 emphasises dividing projects into manageable and controllable stages. It is adopted in many countries worldwide, including the UK, western European countries, and Australia. Warwickshire County Council uses Prince 2 principles for many of its major projects.

### **Rail Franchise**

Passenger rail franchising is the system of contracting out the operation of the passenger services on the railways of Great Britain to private companies through a system of franchising. The system was created in the 1990s as part of the privatisation of British Rail and involves franchises being awarded by the government to train operating companies through a process of competitive tendering. Franchises usually last for a minimum of seven years.

### **SLC Rail**

Formed in 2009 SLC is a consultancy firm that provides guidance and advice on the development of new rail stations for third parties outside of Network Rail. SLC Rail were commissioned by Warwickshire County Council to assist in the delivery of Kenilworth Station.

**Track Slew**

Where rail track is realigned by slewing from one side to another. In the case of a new station this ensures that the track is the correct distance from the platform.

**Train Operating Company**

A train operating company (TOC) is a business operating passenger trains on the railway system of Great Britain under the collective National Rail brand. TOCs have existed since the privatisation of the network under the Railways Act 1993.

There are two types of TOC: most hold franchises let by the government, following bids from various companies, to operate services on certain routes for a specified duration, while a small number of open access operators hold licences to provide supplementary services on chosen routes. These operators can run services for the duration of the licence validity.

The term is also sometimes used to describe companies operating passenger or freight rail services over tracks that are owned by another company or a national network owner.

**West Midlands Rail Executive**

West Midlands Rail Executive (WMRE) is a municipally owned corporation which was formed to manage rail transport policy in the West Midlands. It is jointly owned by a partnership of 16 local authorities. Established in December 2017, WMR has joint responsibility for overseeing rail services running within the region along with the Department for Transport, a central government department. In particular, it oversees the operations of the train operating company West Midlands Trains.

**West Midlands Signalling Centre**

A state of the art installation at Saltley to the north of Birmingham City Centre. The facility enables service models to be trialled before putting them into operation.

**153 Unit**

A single car diesel unit first produced in the early 1990s